Formalism and Judicial Supremacy in Federal Indian Law by Skibine, Alex Tallchief
American Indian Law Review
Volume 32 | Number 2
1-1-2008
Formalism and Judicial Supremacy in Federal
Indian Law
Alex Tallchief Skibine
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Supreme
Court of the United States Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alex T. Skibine, Formalism and Judicial Supremacy in Federal Indian Law, 32 Am. Indian L. Rev. (2008),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol32/iss2/2




I. Introduction ............................................ 391
II. Inherent Tribal Sovereignty ................................ 397
A. The Functionalist Beginnings: Oliphant and Montana ........ 397
B. Form over Function: From Brendale to Hicks ............... 400
C. Implicit Divestiture Doctrine in the Lower Courts After Hicks .. 409
1. Montana's Second Exception After Hicks ................ 409
2. Montana's First Exception After Hicks .................. 411
D. Summary of Supreme Court's Implicit Divestiture Jurisprudence 414
Ill. Formalism in State Jurisdiction Cases ....................... 416
A. The Functionalist Years: From Infringement to Indian Preemption 416
B. Mismanaging Preemption: Cotton Petroleum and Milhelm ..... 420
C. Preempting Preemption in State Regulations of Nonmembers... 422
1. The Indian Country Cases ............................. 422
2. Wagnon v. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Nation ............ 426
D. State Regulation of Tribes and Tribal Members ............. 428
1. The "Legal Incidence of the Tax" Cases .................. 429
2. State Taxation of Indian Owned Fee Land ................ 430
Conclusion ............................................... 436
. Introduction
There is no question that in the last thirty years, the Supreme Court has
presided over an unprecedented assault on the sovereignty of Indian tribes.'
At the same time, the Court has allowed a substantial increase of state
* S.J. Quinney Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law; J.D.
Northwestern University. I want to thank professors Matthew Fletcher, Ezra Rosser, and Philip
Frickey for thoughtful readings of a previous draft. I also want to thank the S.J. Quinney
College of Law's Faculty Development Fund for its financial assistance.
1. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Teaching Indian Law in an Anti-Tribal Era, 82 N.D. L.
REV. 777 (2006) [hereinafter Skibine, Teaching Indian Law].
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jurisdiction inside Indian reservations.2 Scholars have explained this result by
pointing out that the Court has abandoned the foundational principles of
Indian law as first laid down by Chief Justice Marshall, replacing it with a
new subjectivism,3 favoring states' rights,4 thereby abandoning the
"exceptionalism" that had been the hallmark of Federal Indian law.' I have
argued elsewhere that the tribes' problem has been the Court's adoption of a
Dependency Paradigm governing the incorporation of Indian tribes within the
American political and legal system.6 Adoption of this paradigm has not only
allowed the Court to issue decisions mostly detrimental to Indian tribes, but
has also allowed the Court to assume the lead in determining the terms of
tribal incorporation within the United States political system, thus achieving
judicial supremacy in an area constitutionally assigned to the Congress.
In this article, I focus on federal common law and the methodology the
Court has used in order to achieve results mostly detrimental to tribal
sovereign interests. I argue that the Court has used what can be termed a
formalistic mode of analysis to achieve judicial supremacy and hide pragmatic
but subjective choices that are not in accordance with current congressional
policies.7 Focusing on two federal Indian common law doctrines - the
2. See David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States'
Rights, Color-Blind Justice, and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REv. 267 (2001) [hereinafter
Getches, Beyond Indian Law].
3. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the
Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1573 (1996); see also Philip P. Frickey, A
Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture oflndian TribalAuthority
Over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1 (1999) (arguing that the Court has manufactured a new
federal Indian common law by importing values from constitutional law and other areas of
general public law).
4. See Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note 2.
5. See Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119
HARv. L. REv. 431 (2005) [hereinafter Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism]. In a
somewhat similar vein, see Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court's Indian Problem, 59
Hastings L.J. 579 (2008) (arguing that the Court is deciding "Indian law" cases for reasons and
on grounds not derived from federal Indian law principles but based on overarching
constitutional issues and principles not related to Indian law or concerns.
6. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes Within "Our
Federalism ": Beyond the Dependency Paradigm, 38 CoNN. L. REv. 667 (2006) [hereinafter
Skibine, Redefining the Status].
7. The Court's use of formal rules to assert its authority is not limited to achieving
supremacy over Congress. It can also be used to impose its edict on state courts and lower
federal courts. Arguing that the Court is very much a political Court that acts as a legislature
when it decides issues based on federal common law, Judge Posner has observed that "[t]he
Court tries to use the few cases that it agrees to hear as occasions for laying down rules or
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implicit divestiture doctrine and the Indian preemption inquiry - I show how
these two doctrines, originally fashioned by justices with functionalism in
mind, have been transformed or discarded using a formalist approach. I argue
that instead of restraining its judicial activism,' the Court has promoted its
own notions of what the place of Indian tribes should be within our federal
system by adopting formalism as its theory of adjudication.
Before proceeding further, a few definitions of the terms formalism and
functionalism are in order. As stated by professor Frederick Schauer, "[a]t the
heart of the word 'formalism,' in many of its numerous uses, lies the concept
of decisionmaking according to rule."9 Functionalism on the other hand,
prefers the application of "standards" to resolve a given dispute. These
standards generally should allow courts more flexibility in weighing the
importance of various contexts in applying the law to the facts of each case.
As stated by Professor William Eskridge:
Another way of contracting formalism and functionalism focuses
on the reasoning process by which we reach rules or standards.
Formalism might be understood as deduction from authoritative
constitutional text, structure, original intent, or all three working
together. Functionalism might be understood as induction from
constitutional theory or practice, with practice typically being
examined over time. Formalist reasoning promises stability and
continuity of analysis over time; functionalist reasoning promises
adaptability and evolution."10
In this article, I do not join the greater debate about whether, normatively
speaking, functionalism is always better than formalism.1" I only argue here
that in the field of federal Indian common law, a functional approach is
superior in resolving conflicts between the federal, state, and tribal
standards that will control a large number of future cases." Richard A Posner, The Supreme
Court 2004 Term, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 37 (2004).
8. On defining judicial activism, see Keenan D. Kmiec, Comment, The Origin and
Current Meanings of "Judicial Activism," 92 CAL. L. REV. 1441 (2004).
9. Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988).
10. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in
Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 21 (1998).
11. Although my functionalist tendencies incline me to think that the answer may vary
depending on the field, i.e., constitutional law, statutory interpretation, or federal common law,
I do agree with Professor Eskridge that in some areas, such as separation of powers, the better
approach may be to mix the two together. See id.
No. 2]
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governments. While some scholars have been critical of formalism, not all
scholars have rejected formalism, at least not completely. 3 There is, in effect,
a vibrant debate about what is formalism and whether it is a good or bad thing.
Some scholars have taken the position that formalism is a much more nuanced
concept than advocated by others, and as such formalism should have a
legitimate role in Americanjurisprudence.' 4 Others have been more sanguine
in criticizing formalism. For instance, speaking about Supreme Court cases
dealing with federalism, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky stated that the reason
the federalism cases are formalistic was that "they reasoned deductively from
minimally justified premises and expressly eschewed consideration of what
would be best from a policy perspective."' 5 Professor Chemerinsky also
argued that although legal theory has evolved from formalism to legal realism,
the justices of the current Supreme Court have reverted to formalism in
deciding issues of federalism. This, according to Chemerinsky, has allowed
the justices to hide their policy choices behind arcane rules.
I think the exact same thing has happened in federal Indian law. One of the
hallmarks of formalism in federal Indian law cases has been the methodical
use of much older cases as precedents supporting a general rule. The
mechanical use of such older cases has allowed the Court to avoid stating any
current moral or policy reasons for the rule being adopted or claimed. As one
scholar observed:
One view of the vice of Formalism takes that vice to be one of
deception, either of oneself or of others. To disguise a choice in
the language of definitional inexorability obscures that choice and
thus obscures questions of how it was made and whether it could
have been made differently.' 6
One reason why functionalism is superior to formalism in the field of
federal Indian common law is that although Congress is said to have the
12. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal
Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 9-25 (1984) (discussing problems with traditional legal theory such as
formalism and its focus on "rules").
13. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, Ambivalence About Formalism, 93 VA. L. REv. 1 (2007);
see also Eskridge, supra note 10 (arguing that mixing formalism and functionalism in separation
of powers cases may be a good thing).
14. See Schauer, supra note 9; see also Allison H. Eid, Federalism and Formalism, 11 WM.
&MARY BILL RTS. J. 1191, 1208-11 (2003).
15. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism andFunctionalism inFederalismAnalysis, 13 GA.
ST. U. L. REv. 959 (1997).
16. Schauer, supra note 9, at 513-14.
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exclusive power to regulate the field of Indian affairs, the political reality is
that while Congress has adopted broad policies favoring tribal self-
government, it has very seldomly addressed precise issues involving
conflicting tribal and state claims to powers over nonmembers within Indian
reservations. A functional approach in federal Indian law would force the
Court to explain why its holdings are congruent with current congressional
policies, and if not, why not. Hopefully, this would restrict judicial activism
and curb judicial supremacy by forcing the Court to tie its reasoning to
congressional legislation, thus creating a better balance between congressional
and judicial power. Another reason to prefer functionalism is that the absence
of formalistic rules would leave more leeway for the states, the tribes and the
federal government to negotiate such jurisdictional disputes. 7
Before the ascendancy of the Rehnquist Court, the modem foundations of
federal Indian law had been established by one of legal realism's most
influential scholars, Felix Cohen.' 8 In a recent article, Professor Philip
Frickey made the insightful observation that the very idea of Felix Cohen
writing a black letter law treatise in Indian law was contrary to his position as
a legal realist. 9 That is because legal treaties, by their very nature, are
undertakings reflecting a formalistic view of the law, while Cohen was a legal
realist who believed in a functional approach to the law.20 In this article, I do
not deny that some of Cohen's foundations relied on formalistic principles.
But what I argue is that the Court in the years following Felix Cohen, was
influenced by legal realism and did adopt functional principles in federal
Indian Law. In his article, Professor Frickey briefly touched on the fact that
some of the cases decided by the Supreme Court since the late 1970's have a
formalistic nature.2 ' Inspired by Professor Frickey's suggestion, in this article
17. See Lorie Graham, Securing Economic Sovereignty Through Agreements, 37 NEw ENG.
L. REv. 523 (2003); see also Note, Intergovernmental Compacts in Native American Law:
Models for Expanded Usage, 112 HARV. L. REV. 922 (1999).
18. See Foreword to COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW ix-xv (Nell Jessup
Newton et al. eds., 2005). On Cohen's realism, see Jeremy Paul, Felix Cohen's Brand ofLegal
Realism, 38 CONN. L. REv. 593 (2006).
19. See Philip P. Frickey, Transcending Transcendental Nonsense: Towards a New Realism
in Federal Indian Law, 38 CONN. L. REV. 649 (2006) [hereinafter Frickey, Towards a New
Realism].
20. See Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REv. 809 (1935).
21. See Frickey, Towards a New Realism, supra note 19, at 657-60 (mentioning Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), and Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), as
prime examples).
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2008
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
I show how the Rehnquist Court's basic enterprise in federal Indian law has
been not only to replace the modem foundations of Indian law as established
by Felix Cohen,2 but also to replace functional standards influenced by a legal
realism that favored pluralist values, with formalistic rules influenced, if
anything, by an outdated version of legal positivism.
23
In an earlier article, Professor Frickey had argued that practical reasoning,
and/or pragmatism, rather than more "foundationalist" theory such as
formalism, intentionalism, or textualism, could better explain the Court's
thinking in Indian cases.24 While there is no doubt that pragmatic
considerations continue to affect the Court's decisions,25 I believe that since
1988, the Court's decisions have been increasingly shaped and influenced by
the use of both formalism as a theory of adjudication, and its progeny in the
field of statutory interpretation, textualism. 26 I realize that mixing formalism
and pragmatism 7 can be seen as counter-intuitive, because pragmatism has
frequently been identified as the opposite of formalism. 28 Similar to a claim
made by one scholar evaluating changing approaches in the development of
state common law in the field of torts,29 my position is that the Court's
jurisprudence in federal Indian common law reflects a hybrid use of formalism
22. As pointed out in Frickey, Towards a New Realism, supra note 19, I do not deny here
that there is a paradox between Cohen the legal realist and Cohen the treatise writer and these
foundationalist principles may have been formalistic in nature. For a comprehensive analysis
of Felix Cohen's legal philosophy, see Dalia Tsuk, The New Deal Origins ofAmerican Legal
Pluralism, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 189 (2001).
23. For an argument accusing some members of the Court of doing just that in other areas
than federal Indian law, see Ofer Raban, The Supreme Court's Endorsement of Politicized
Judiciary: A Philosophical Critique, 8 J.L. Soc'Y 114 (2007).
24. See Philip Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic
Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137 (1990).
25. As Professor Frickey recently stated, the Court's federal Indian law is "jerry-rigging a
ruthlessly pragmatic blend of federal Indian Law with general American law." Frickey, (Native)
American Exceptionalism, supra note 5, at 460.
26. It has to be noted that Frickey's article was published in 1990 and probably written in
1989. In previous writings, I have identified 1988 as a turning point for the Court in Indian
cases. See Skibine, Teaching Indian Law, supra note 1.
27. For a concise definition of Pragmatism, see Richard A. Posner, Legal Pragmatism
Defended, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 683 (2004).
28. For an analysis describing the evolution of pragmatism, as well as its split between
classical pragmatism and neo-pragmatism, see Susan Haack, On Legal Pragmatism: Where
Does "The Path of The Law" Lead Us?, 50 AM J. JuRis. 71 (2005).
29. See Marin Roger Scordato, Post-Realist Blues: Formalism, Instrumentalism, and the
Hybrid Nature of Common Law Jurisprudence, 7 NEV. L.J. 263 (2007).
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and practical reasoning or instrumentalism.3 ° My argument is that the Court
has used formalism to come up with rules justifying decisions fitting the
Justice's own pragmatic views without having to tie these decisions to
congressional policies, or any kind of historical context.
In Part II of this article, I discuss the evolution of the implicit divestiture
doctrine, determining the amount of inherent sovereignty retained by Indian
tribes over their people and territory. I show how the Court has progressively
transformed the doctrine to discount functional factors. In Part I, I describe
how the Court has moved away from functionalism and towards formalism in
determining the amount of state jurisdiction within Indian country.
II. Inherent Tribal Sovereignty and the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine
A. The Functional Formalist Beginnings: Oliphant and Montana
The Court started its attack on inherent tribal sovereignty in 1978 when it
decided Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe3 and held that Indian tribes had
been implicitly divested of the inherent power to criminally prosecute non-
Indians for crimes perpetrated against tribal members within Indian
reservations. Although Justice Rehnquist spent much of his opinion
attempting to show that the three branches of the United States government
shared a presumption that tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians, he was in fact adopting a very different principle to determine the
extent of tribal sovereignty that had prevailed in the past. Until then, the
generally accepted and rather formalistic rule put forth by Felix Cohen had
been that Indian tribes had retained all of their inherent sovereign powers
unless such powers had been taken away by an Act of Congress or given up
in a treaty.32 After first declaring that Indian tribes could not exercise any
inherent sovereign power inconsistent with their status,3 Justice Rehnquist at
first seemed to inject a functional aspect to his analysis when he stated,
without any elaboration, that "[u]pon incorporation into the territory of the
United States, the Indian tribes thereby came under the territorial sovereignty
of the United States and their exercise of separate power is constrained so as
30. Certainly the Court's formalist tendencies can co-exist with other approaches. See, e.g.,
Joshua A. Klein, Note, Commerce Clause Questions After Morrison: Some Observations on the
New Formalism, and the New Realism, 53 STAN. L. REv. 571 (2002).
31. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
32. See FELIX S. COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERALINDiAN LAW 122 (Univ. OfN.M. photo.
reprint 1971) (1942).
33. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208.
No. 2]
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not to conflict with the interest of this overriding sovereignty."34 This
principle could have left some room for a functional analysis if the Court had
proceeded to balance the tribe's interest in asserting criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians with the interest of the United States in not exposing non-Indians
to tribal prosecution. Instead, however, the Court's formalistic analysis
limited itself to the two following sentences
[F]rom the formation of the Union and the adoption of the Bill of
Rights, the United States has manifested an equally great solicitude
that its citizens be protected by the United States from unwarranted
intrusions on their personal liberty .... By submitting to the
overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes therefore
necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the
United States except in a manner acceptable to Congress."
The Court substantially modified its Oliphant analysis in Montana v.
UnitedStates.36 The crucial issue in Montana was whether Oliphant's implicit
divestiture doctrine could be extended beyond criminal jurisdiction to cases
asking the Court to decide whether Indian tribes could regulate hunting and
fishing by nonmembers on lands owned by non-tribal members within the
boundaries of the tribe's reservation.37 The Court extended Oliphant and held
that the tribe had been implicitly divested of such civil regulatory
jurisdiction.3"
This decision is a mix of functional and formalist principles, perhaps
because it was written by Justice Stewart, a moderate Republican. This is not
an unusual move and at least one prominent scholar has taken the position
that, at least in constitutional separation of powers cases, this might be the
correct approach.39 On one hand Montana is a formalist decision since the
Court there announced a formal general rule of no tribal jurisdiction over
nonmembers on nonmember fee land within Indian reservation. Furthermore,
the Court based this general rule on another formal rule adopted in dicta found
34. Id. at 209. The Court did rely on two very old precedents, United States v. Rogers, 45
U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846) and Johnson v. MIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), to
legitimize the principle but did not explain why any statements made in 1823 and 1846 were so
relevant to deciding a case in 1978.
35. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at210.
36. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
37. Id. at 547.
38. Id. at 656-67.
39. See Eskridge, supra note 10.
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in a previous case, United States v. Wheeler,4 ° which stated that Indian tribes
have been implicitly divested of all external sovereignty.4 Moreover, the
Court in Montana asserted without any explanation that by "external"
sovereignty, it meant any tribal relations having to do with nonmembers.
4 1
However, having set out its formal rule, Justice Stewart inserted functional
elements in the analysis. First, he asserted that it is only the exercise of tribal
powers beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government that is
inconsistent with the tribes' dependent status, and therefore implicitly
divested.43 Secondly, he came up with two exceptions to his "general
proposition that the inherent powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the
activities of nonmembers of the tribe." Thus, the Court stated
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to
exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their
reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate
through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of
nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or
its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or
other arrangements. A tribe may also retain inherent power to
exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee
lands within its reservations when that conduct threatens or has
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security,
or the health or welfare of the tribe.45
At least the Montana second exception seemed to call for an essentially
functional analysis, because in order to determine whether tribal control over
nonmembers was necessary to tribal self-government, the Court has to
evaluate whether the activity of such non-Indians has a direct impact on the
health and welfare of the tribe, its economic security, or its political integrity.
However, having announced its seemingly functional second exception, the
Court abruptly limited its analysis to basically these two sentences:
[N]othing in this case suggests that such non-Indian hunting and
fishing so threaten the Tribe's political or economic security so as
to justify tribal regulation. The complaint in the District Court did
40. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
41. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564 (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326).
42. Id. (citation omitted).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 565.
45. Id. at 565-66 (citation omitted).
No. 2]
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not allege that non-Indian hunting and fishing on fee lands imperil
the subsistence or welfare of the Tribe. 6
Of course, there was no reason for the tribe to allege such a threat by non-
Indians in the lower courts since the Court had not yet come down with a
general rule of non-jurisdiction and an exception asking the tribe to prove that
such nonmember activity posed such threat to tribal communities.
The Court initially seemed to define the Montana second exception
broadly, calling for a functional analysis. Thus, in National Farmers Union
Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe,47 the Court held that before tribal jurisdiction
could be challenged by nonmembers in federal court, the plaintiff had to
exhaust their tribal remedies because "the existence and extent of a tribal
court's jurisdiction will require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty,
[and] the extent to which that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or
diminished." ' A couple of years later, the Court confirmed the "exhaustion"
requirement, stating
Tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation
lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty. Civil jurisdiction
over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts ....
"Because the Tribe retains all inherent attributes of sovereignty
that have not been divested by the Federal Government, the proper
inference from silence ... is that the sovereign power.., remains
intact." 49
B. Form over Function: From Brendale to Hicks
The Court's outlook began to change the next time it addressed inherent
tribal sovereignty, when it issued a series of concurring and dissenting
opinions in a 1989 case, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
46. Id. at 566. The Court also further remarked that "the District Court made express
findings, left unaltered by the Court of Appeals, that the Crow Tribe has traditionally
accommodated itself to the State's 'near exclusive' regulation of hunting and fishing on fee
lands within the reservation." Id.
47. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
48. Id. at 855-56.
49. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Laplante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 n. 14 (1982)) (citations omitted). On the exhaustion of tribal
remedies doctrine, see generally Alex Tallchief Skibine, Deference Owed Tribal Courts'
Jurisdictional Determination: Towards Co-Existence, Understanding, and Respect Between
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Yakima Indian Nation."0 The issue in Brendale was whether the Yakima
Indian Nation could zone nonmember fee lands within its reservation. Even
though all the Justices admitted that the Montana case controlled the outcome,
the Court was badly fractured on Montana's implications. Justice White,
joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy, held that the Tribe could
never have any inherent power to zone non-Indian fee land."' Justices
Marshall, Brennan and Blackman believed that a tribe always has the authority
to zone all lands within its reservation. 2 Finally, Justices Stevens and
O'Connor held that the Tribe could zone nonmember fee land in the "closed"
part of the reservation where the tribe or its members owned the substantial
majority of the total acreage but could not regulate such nonmember land in
the "open" part of the reservation where nonmembers owned a substantial
amount of land. 3
According to Justice White's more formalistic approach, the governing
principle was that tribes never have authority to actually zone nonmember fee
land. 4 The only thing that tribes have is a "protectible interest" to intervene
in a county zoning proceeding and argue that the zoning at issue will have a
"demonstrably serious" impact that "must imperil the political integrity, the
economic security or the health and welfare of the tribe."" The tribe could
then challenge the county's ultimate zoning decision in federal court. These
four Justices (White, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy) also thought that
practically speaking, a functional approach to Montana's second exception
"would make little sense in the circumstances of these cases," 6 because tribal
and county zoning authority over such nonmember fee land could then keep
switching back and forth, depending on whether the nonmember activity on
such land threatened the tribe at any given time.
In determining that a tribe could still zone nonmember fee land in parts of
the reservation where the tribe or its members still owned a substantial amount
of land, Justices Stevens and O'Connor took a more political (or perhaps
pragmatic) approach, albeit one partly justified on rather formal property
concepts. They held that the original right to exclude nonmembers from the
reservation continued to vest the tribe with zoning authority as long a the tribe
50. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
51. Id. at 414-33.
52. Id. at 448-68
53. Id. at 433-49. For criticism and a comprehensive analysis of Brendale, see Joseph
William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1991).
54. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 430.
55. Id. at431.
56. Id. at 429.
No. 2]
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"has preserved the power to define the essential character of that area."57
Although Stevens asserted that the tribe had preserved that power by
maintaining the power to exclude nonmembers from all but a small area of
that part of the reservation, he backed that statement by relying substantially
on assumptions of what Congress must have intended when it allowed non-
Indians to acquire lands within Indian reservations. 8
Finally Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Brennan took the position that
zoning was an essential aspect of tribal self-government and therefore fit right
into the second Montana exception. In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Blackmun gave one of the most eloquent - and perhaps one of the last -
defenses of tribal sovereignty and the functional approach. He first argued
that Montana could not be considered to be the first and only case defining the
extent of tribal sovereignty, but should be understood in its historical context.
He concluded that Montana cannot be understood to prevent tribes from
exercising jurisdiction when important tribal interests are at stake.
In previous writings, I have identified 1988 as the year the Court started a
definite anti-tribal period.59 The three Brendale opinions represent good
examples of the three distinct approaches to Indian cases: formalist,
political/pragmatic, and functionalist. The case itself can be viewed as
somewhat of a turning point in Indian law. Sadly for tribal interests,
Blackmun's functional analysis and understanding of Montana did not
prevail. Furthermore, Blackmun and the two Justices whojoined his Brendale
opinion - Marshall and Brennan - would soon retire from the Court. The
next case involving tribal sovereignty over nonmembers definitely reflected
both a change in the Court's personnel and a new formalistic bias.
57. Id. at 441.
58. For instance Justice Stevens stated,
Although it is inconceivable that Congress would have intended that the sale of
a few lots would divest the Tribe of the power to determine the character of the
tribal community, it is equally improbable that Congress envisioned that the Tribe
would retain its interest in regulating the use of vast ranges of land sold in fee to
nonmembers who lack any voice in setting tribal policy.
Id. at 437. Justice Stevens came back to this line of reasoning a few page later, stating:
In my opinion, just as Congress could not possibly have intended in enacting the
Dawes Act that tribes would maintain the power to exclude bona fide purchasers
of reservation land from that property, it could not have intended that tribes would
lose control over the character of their reservations upon the sale of a few,
relatively small parcels of land.
Id. at 441.
59. See also Skibine, Teaching Indian Law, supra note 1.
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Although the 1993 decision in South Dakota v. Bourland," can be viewed
as an inherent tribal sovereignty case and was surely viewed as such by the
dissent, this does not seem to be the way Justice Thomas saw it. Writing for
the majority in his first federal Indian law opinion, Justice Thomas, stated the
issue in Bourland to be whether the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe still had a
treaty right to regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers in an area of the
reservation which had been taken by the United States for a dam and reservoir
project under two Acts of Congress: the Flood Control Act of 1944,6" and the
Cheyenne River Act.62 The Court held that the acquisition of such lands by
the United States pursuant to these two acts abrogated the tribe's treaty right
to exclude nonmembers in those areas, and thus took away the lesser tribal
right to regulate such nonmembers. Although Justice Thomas acknowledged
that the tribe could technically claim jurisdiction under the second Montana
exception, he stated that the district court had already held against the tribe as
to all the areas except for 18,000 acres. He left the district court's finding
undisturbed and left a decision on the 18,000 acres to be dealt with on remand.
However, footnote 15 of his opinion was much more telling about his position
relative to the second Montana exception. There he stated:
The dissent's complaint that we give "barely a nod" to the Tribe's
inherent sovereignty argument is simply another manifestation of
its disagreement with Montana .... While the dissent refers to our
"myopic focus" on the Tribe's prior treaty right .... it shuts both
eyes to the reality that after Montana, tribal sovereignty over
nonmembers "cannot survive without express congressional
delegation," and is therefore not inherent.' 63
In other words, for Justice Thomas, the case should have been governed by
one formal rule: there is no inherent tribal authority over nonmembers, period,
unless such authority has been delegated to the tribe by the Congress.
The Court revisited the issue of inherent tribal powers over nonmembers
four years later in its 1997 decision, Strate v. A-i Contractors.' The issue in
Strate was whether the tribal court had jurisdiction over a civil law suit
involving one nonmember who sued another nonmember over a minor traffic
60. 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
61. Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 887.
62. Pub. L. No. 83-776, 68 Stat. 1191 (1954).
63. Bourland, 508 U.S. at 695 n. 15 (citation omitted)
64. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
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accident on a highway running through the reservation."5 The Court initially
took the position that since the state had obtained a right of way over the
highway, the land where the accident occurred could be treated as non-Indian
fee land for jurisdictional purposes. Thus, the Court seemed poised to
determine whether controlling non-Indian conduct on the highway was
necessary to tribal self-government in that such activities could have a direct
impact or imperil the health and welfare of the tribe or its members. However,
after first remarking that a broad construction of Montana's second exception
could swallow the Montana rule, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court,
undertook a typical formalistic and mechanical analysis of all the cases
initially listed as supporting the second Montana exception, noting that each
case "raised the question whether a State's (or Territory's) exercise of
authority would trench unduly on tribal self-government."66 Having stated
that, the Court abruptly concluded that because the non-Indian plaintiff here
could pursue her case in a state forum, "[o]pening the Tribal Court for her
optional use is not necessary to protect tribal self-government; and... is not
crucial to 'the political integrity, the economic security, or the health and
welfare of the [Three Affiliate Tribes]."67
Although some have cited Strate as an example of the Court's minimalist
philosophy,68 the looming impact of the decision becomes more obvious when
one recalls that earlier in the opinion, Justice Ginsburg had stated that the
adjudicatory jurisdiction of a tribal court could never be larger than the
regulatory jurisdiction of the tribal council. In other words, the Court had just
laid down a rule that an Indian tribe never has regulatory authority over any
nonmember driving on a reservation road, at least not when the state owns the
title or a right of way to such road. More importantly, the Court in Strate
implied that the functionalist analysis called for under the second Montana
exception is just not applicable whenever a party could have filed the same
case in state court. Thus, the Court in Strate seemed to have transformed the
second Montana exception from a test asking the tribe to show why tribal
jurisdiction was necessary to tribal self-government by reference to the impact
65. Id. at 442.
66. Id. at 458. I have argued elsewhere that the cases listed in Montana could not possibly
support the second exception to the general rule since there was no general rule to start with
before the Montana Court invented one. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Court's Use of the
Implicit Divestiture Doctrine to Implement Its Imperfect Notion of Federalism in Indian
Country, 36 TULSA L.J. 267, 271-75 (2000)[hereinafter Skibine, Imperfect Notion].
67. Strate, 520 U.S. at 459 (citation omitted).
68. See Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law Once Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism
and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 1177 (2001).
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the non-Indian activities had on tribal members to one asking the tribe to also
show why state jurisdiction over the same activity would unduly trench on
tribal self-government. In other words, the Court began the process of
imposing on tribes the burden of not only showing that their sovereignty had
not been implicitly divested but also that state jurisdiction in this area had
been otherwise preempted.69 This trend would become even more obvious in
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Nevada v. Hicks.70
The issue in Hicks was whether a tribal member could sue a state game
warden in tribal court for torts committed while the state warden was
investigating crimes related to violations of state hunting laws the tribal
member was alleged to have committed while off the reservation.7 The
distinguishing factor with previous implicit divestiture cases was that the
alleged torts committed by the state official in Hicks occurred on land owned
by tribal members. In other words, the lands did not qualify as nonmember
fee land.
After holding that the Montana general rule barring tribal jurisdiction over
nonmembers extended to all lands within the reservation, Justice Scalia,
writing for the Court, seemed to first indicate that he was going to undertake
a comprehensive functional balancing analysis to determine if the tribe had
jurisdiction under the second Montana exception. However, after stating that
"State sovereignty does not end at a reservation border," Scalia limited his
analysis to just asserting that determining whether a tribe has inherent
sovereign jurisdiction over nonmembers required "an accommodation between
the interests of the Tribes and the Federal Government, on the one hand, and
those of the State on the other."72 In the past, applying such a test had
generated some lengthy analysis.73 However, after observing that some much
older cases had mentioned that service of process from state courts could
reach parties inside Indian reservations,74 Scalia abruptly concluded that the
tribal court did not have jurisdiction in this case. The totality of his analysis
is contained in the following two sentences
69. For an analysis predicting this trend, see Skibine, supra note 66.
70. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
71. Id. at 355.
72. Id. at 362.
73. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134 (1980); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
74. Justice Scalia mentioned Utah & Northern Railway Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885),
and United States v. Kagarma, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
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We conclude today, in accordance with these prior statements, that
tribal authority to regulate state officers in executing process
related to the violation, off reservation, of state laws is not
essential to tribal self-government or internal relations - to "the
right to make their own laws and be ruled by them." The State's
interest in execution of process is considerable, and even when it
relates to Indian-fee lands it no more impairs the tribe's self-
government than federal enforcement of law impairs state
government.
75
I have argued elsewhere that Scalia's Hicks opinion could be understood as
the federal Indian law equivalent to the Court's federalism decision of
Gregory v. Ashcroft.76 In that case, the Court required a clear statement from
Congress of its intent to interfere with a core state function - such as the
appointment and length of tenure of state judges - before it would interpret
a federal statute to overturn a conflicting state law." Similarly, Hicks could
be understood as requiring a clear statement from Congress before a core state
function - such as a criminal investigation - could be interfered with even
when performed inside an Indian reservation. Certainly, this understanding
would conform with the Court's formalist and textualist trends since it would
not demand any balancing analysis, or any determination of congressional
intent before determining whether tribal jurisdiction was allowed.
Justice Scalia waited until Part V of his opinion to give some pragmatic or
practical reasons for his decision. 78 Thus, after mentioning that the actions of
the state officers could not possibly threaten tribal interests because these
officers were fully subject to "the limitations of federal constitutional and
statutory law, 79 Scalia observed that the tribe and its members could always
"invoke the authority of the Federal Government and federal courts (or the
state government and state courts) to vindicate constitutional or other federal-
75. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364.
76. 501 U.S. 452 (1991); see Alex TallchiefSkibine, MakingSense OutofNevada v. Hicks:
A Reinterpretation, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 347 (2001).
77. On clear statement rules and federalism, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45
VAND. L. REv. 593 (1992).
78. Part V seems to have been an afterthought generated by the need to defend himself from
some of the criticisms leveled by Justice O'Connor in her concurrent opinion. Hicks, 533 U.S.
at 370-75.
79. Id. at 371.
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and state-law rights"' ° in cases where the state officers had not acted lawfully
in the performance of their duties. In other words, according to Scalia, tribal
courts should be denied jurisdiction in this case because the tribe or its
members can always file a law suit in federal or state courts.8 '
Justice Souter filed a concurring opinion which was joined by Justices
Kennedy and Thomas.82 The opinion is interesting because it reveals Justice
Souter's own "pragmatic" reasons behind his rather formalistic approach. 3
The "sound policy" reasons given by Justice Souter are striking for their
subjectivism and total detachment from congressional policy. First, he
mentioned that tying tribal authority to land status would create "an unstable
crazy jurisdictional quilt."' He then mentioned that because tribal courts
differ from other American courts in their structure and in the substantive law
they are applying,85 the result is a "complex mix... which would be unusually
difficult for an outsider to sort out."8 6 Finally after mentioning that tribal
courts' decisions on matters of non-tribal law cannot be appealed to state or
federal courts, he concluded that this would result in "a risk of substantial
disuniformity in the interpretation of state and federal law, a risk underscored
by the fact that tribal courts are often subordinate to the political branches of
tribal governments.""
Part III of Souter's opinion is striking for its brevity. Instead of undertaking
a comprehensive functional analysis to determine if the second Montana
80. Id. at 373.
81. This argument is reminiscent of Justice White's opinion in Brendale. See supra notes
50-51 and accompanying text (arguing that tribes' only right is to intervene in a county zoning
proceeding and appeal to a federal court if the County's zoning decision goes against them).
82. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 375.
83. Apparently, Souter wrote his concurring opinion because he disagreed with Scalia's
approach in that he saw no reasons to look at the state interest before undertaking the Montana
analysis. Souter also disagreed with Scalia on the importance that should be given to the status
of the land in such inquiry. Souter did not think the status of the land where the nonmember
conduct occurred was important at all while Scalia thought it could sometime be a determinative
factor. See Recent Case, Ford Motor Co. v. Todecheene, 394 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2005), 118
HARv. L. REv. 2469, 2473-74 (2005).
84. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 383. Souter conveniently forgot to mention that the very existence
of such a crazy jurisdictional quilt is due to the Court's previous cases restricting tribal
jurisdiction while allowing state jurisdiction within Indian country.
85. But see Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Toward a Theory of Intertribal and Intratribal
Common Law, 43 Hous. L. REv. 701 (2006) (arguing that in fact, in cases involving
nonmembers, tribal courts have been applying western concepts of law, reserving application
of traditional tribal law to cases involving only tribal members).
86. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 384-85.
87. Id. at 385.
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exception validates tribal jurisdiction, he only stated the following:"[a]s Judge
Rymer indicated in her dissent, the uncontested fact that the tribal court itself
authorized service of the state warrant here bars any serious contention that
the execution of the warrant adversely affected the Tribes' political
integrity. 8 8 But the fact that the tribal court authorized service cannot
possibly mean that it understood thereby that it was giving up all jurisdiction
over any subsequent law suits filed by tribal members alleging that the state
official committed tortious actions against them and, therefore, acted beyond
the authority allowed under the warrant.
Earlier in the same year that Hicks was decided, the Court had the
opportunity to decide a case involving the controversial issue of tribal taxation
ofnonmember businesses located on Indian reservations. In its 2001 decision,
Atkinson Trading Co v. Shirley,89 the Court had to decide whether the Navajo
Nation could tax a non-Indian trading post located on fee land within the
Navajo reservation. The court of appeals had upheld the tribal tax by
complementing the Montana framework "with a case by case approach that
balanced the non Indian fee status of the land with the nature of the inherent
sovereign powers the tribe was attempting to exercise, its interests, and the
impact that the exercise of the tribe's powers has upon the nonmember
interests involved." 9° In other words, the court of appeals used a typical
functional analysis.
While the Supreme Court claimed to consider whether the second Montana
exception would allow the tribe to tax such non-Indian businesses, the Court
just bluntly asserted "we fail to see how petitioner's operation of a hotel on
non-Indian fee land threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe."'"
Conveniently omitted from the Court's discussion is any reference to how a
lack of power to tax non-Indian businesses located on non-Indian fee land
within the reservation might impact or imperil the Navajo Nation's economic
88. Id. at 386.
89. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
90. Id. at 649 (quoting Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 210 F.3d 1247, 1255, 1257, 1261
(10th Cir. 2000)).
91. Id. at 657. The Court also added a meaningful footnote to this sentence remarking that
the Montana case had only talked in terms of nonmember conduct threatening Indian tribes, and
stating that "unless the drain of the nonmember conduct upon tribal services and resources is
so severe that it actually imperils the political integrity of the Indian tribe, there can be no
assertion of civil authority beyond tribal lands. Petitioner's hotel has no such adverse effect
upon the Navajo Nation." Id. at 657 n. 12.
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security. Also absent are any references to any congressional policy
encouraging tribal economic development or self-sufficiency.
C. The Implicit Divestiture Doctrine in the Lower Courts After Hicks
1. Montana's Second Exception After Hicks.
A surprising number of lower court cases have allowed tribal jurisdiction
over nonmembers in spite of Supreme Court precedents such as Strate and
Hicks. For instance, in McDonaldv. Means,92 a horse owned by a nonmember
rancher wandered onto a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) road and caused an
accident involving a tribal member. Because it was a BIA road, the road could
not be considered nonmember fee land so the question was whether Hicks
could be extended so as to deny the tribal court jurisdiction over this law suit.
Allowing the tribal court to have jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit seemed to be
limiting Hicks to its facts or at least to cases arising on Indian lands but
involving law suits against state officials. 93
In South Dakota v. Cummings,94 the South Dakota Supreme Court found
that a state patrolman, in fresh pursuit of another vehicle driven by a tribal
member stemming from a traffic violation committed outside the Indian
reservation, did not have jurisdiction to gather evidence once the tribal
member crossed into the reservation. Although Hicks would seem to indicate
state jurisdiction, the court was able to distinguish Hicks on the basis that it
involved a tribal member trying to sue state officials in tribal court while this
92. 309 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Elliott v. White Mountain Tribal Court, No. CIV
05-4240-PCT-MHM, 2006 WL 3533147 (D. Ariz. Dec. 6, 2006) (holding tribal court to have
jurisdiction over a law suit by the tribe against a non-member who damaged tribal property
when she started a fire within the reservation).
93. Thus the court remarked that "Even if Hicks could be interpreted as suggesting that the
Montana rule is more generally applicable than either Montana or Strate have allowed, Hicks
makes no claim that it modifies or overrules Montana." Id. at 540 n.9. The Ninth Circuit also
made the interesting observation that since the defendant in this case was a member of another
tribe, disallowing tribal court jurisdiction here would be paradoxical inasmuch as the tribe
would still have criminal jurisdiction over the nonmember, since such tribal criminal jurisdiction
had been recognized and reaffirmed byAct of Congress at 25 U.S.C. 1301(2) (2000). Id. at 540
n. 10. This observation leads to the following question: To what extent is the congressional
recognition of tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians incongruent with the Court's
continued position that tribes generally have been implicitly divested of civil jurisdiction over
the same nonmember Indians? How could it be inconsistent with tribal status to have
jurisdiction over non-member Indians in most civil matters while not inconsistent to have
criminal jurisdiction over such non-member Indians?
94. 679 N.W.2d 484 (S.D. 2004).
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case involved the state official trying to prosecute a tribal member in state
court. As the court put it:"[i]n other words, in Hicks, tribal sovereignty was
being used as a sword against state officers. Here, tribal sovereignty is being
used as a shield to protect the tribe's sovereignty from incursion by the
State."95
In Ford Motor Co. v. Todecheene,96 the Ninth Circuit upheld tribal court
exhaustion requirement. After first holding that the tribal court did not have
jurisdiction over a law suit filed by a tribal member against Ford Motor Co.
arising out of a Ford Explorer flipping over on a reservation road, and killing
a tribal policewoman, the court vacated its previous order on the grounds that
it was not obvious that the tribe did not have jurisdiction. Therefore, tribal
court remedies should first be exhausted by the nonmember defendant before
an action challenging the tribal court jurisdiction can be filed in federal
court.97 Similarly, in Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Court,98 a non-
Indian who was lost on the reservation and had started a fire to signal her
position to potential rescuers was sued by the tribe after the fire she had
started ended up burning thousands of acres of reservation land.99 The federal
district court held that because tribal jurisdiction was not plainly lacking, the
nonmember defendant had to first exhaust her tribal court remedies before
filing an action in federal court to challenge the tribal court's jurisdiction.'00
The only federal circuit case that has taken a broad view of Hicks and ruled
against tribal jurisdiction seems to be MacArthur v. San Juan County.'' In
95. Id. at 487.
96. 394 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2005).
97. Ford Motor Co. v. Todecheene, 488 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2007). This requirement was
first mandated by the Supreme Court in National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe
of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
98. No. CIV-05-4240-PCT-MHM, 2006 WL 3533147 (D. Ariz. Dec. 6, 2006).
99. Eventually this signal fire combined with another fire to bum over 400,000 acres of
land on and off the reservation.
100. On the exhaustion of tribal court remedies requirement, see Skibine, Towards Co-
Existence, supra note 49.
101. 497 F.3d 1057(10th Cir. 2007). There may be a number cases decided by state courts
that may have gone against tribal interests. See, e.g., Zempel v. Liberty, 143 P. 3d 123 (2006)
(finding no tribal jurisdiction because the defendant was registered with the state even though
the sole shareholder was a tribal member); see also Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v.
Clinch, 158 P.3d 377 (2007). Interestingly, these cases use an implicit divestiture analysis to
divest the tribes of jurisdiction at the same time that they vest jurisdiction with the states,
thereby following the lead indicated in Justice Scalia's Hicks opinion. Other federal circuit
cases that have ruled against tribal jurisdiction did not rely on Hicks as precedent since the
cause of action arose on non-Indian fee land. Such cases relied mostly on Strate. See for
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this case, Navajo tribal members who had been employed by a health clinic
owned and managed by a state county, but had been fired, sued the county in
Navajo tribal court, alleging wrongfuil termination, among other things. The
clinic was located on the Navajo reservation but on land owned by the County.
Having won in tribal court, the plaintiffs sought to have the tribal order
enforced by the federal court. The Tenth Circuit held that the tribal court did
not have jurisdiction over the County, a nonmember defendant. After
needlessly taking the position that Hicks applied to all cases involving tribal
jurisdiction over non-members,0° the court stated
[T]his case essentially boils down to an employment dispute
between SJHSD and three of its former employees.... While the
Navajo Nation undoubtedly has an interest in regulating
employment relationships between its members and non-Indian
employers on the reservation, that interest is not so substantial in
this case as to affect the Nation's right to make its own laws and be
ruled by them.'03
2. Montana's First Exception After Hicks
Another issue in MacArthur was whether the tribal court had jurisdiction
based on Montana's consensual exception.'" Relying on statements made by
Justice Scalia in Hicks, the Tenth Circuit held that the consensual exception
was not applicable to consensual relations involving county or state
agencies.' Besides relying on Justice Scalia's words, the reasons given by
instance, Nord v. Kelly, 2008 WL 900138 (8' Cir, 2008).
102. MacArthur, 497 F.3d at 1069-70. The land on which the clinic was located was owned
by the County in fee and therefore was non-Indian fee land within the reservation. The court's
use of Hicks as controlling all cases involving assertion of tribal jurisdiction over non-members
on Indian owned lands within the reservation was therefore dicta. For a different take, see for
instance, the discussion of McDonald v. Means at supra notes 92-93.
103. MacArthur, 497 F.3d at 1075.
104. After stating that as a general rule, Indian tribes do not have any inherent sovereign
authority over nonmembers, the Court in Montana had stated that "[a] tribe may regulate
through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe, or its members, through commercial dealings, leases, or other
arrangements." Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66.
105. MacArthur, 497 F.3d at 1073 (quoting Hicks, 533 U.S. at 372 (Scalia, J.) ("The
[Montana] Court ... obviously did not have in mind states or state officers acting in their
governmental capacity; it was referring to private individuals who voluntarily submitted
themselves to tribal regulatory jurisdiction by the arrangements that they (or their employers)
entered into.")).
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the court are somewhat elusive. In effect, the court seemed to have taken the
position that states and counties could not submit to tribal jurisdiction even
when they wanted to. The Tenth Circuit could have taken the position that
under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the exclusive power to regulate
commerce with Indian tribes and, therefore, that "plenary" authority over such
Indian affairs preempts the states or counties from entering into such
agreements with the tribes, at least not without federal approval. The Tenth
Circuit, however, never addressed the argument preferring instead to take the
position that it was the tribes that could not enter into such consensual
agreements because that would "closely resemble the 'freedom independently
to determine their external relations,' and therefore was necessarily
relinquished as a result of the tribes' dependent status."'" But surely, this
argument is a complete misreading of the precedents. It sadly forgets the
holding of the Montana Court stating that consensual relations is an
"exception " to the general proposition that tribes had otherwise lost the power
to independently determine their external relations. 7
Montana's consensual exception was given a much broader reading in
Smith v. Salish & Kootenai College.' The court in Smith found that the
nonmember defendant involved in an auto accident had consented to tribal
jurisdiction under the first Montana exception when he cross appealed against
another named defendant. The problem was that Smith had initially been a
defendant in that law suit; he had been sued in tribal court by injured tribal
members who had been passengers in the truck Smith was driving when it
overturned. However, these passengers had also sued another defendant -
the college that owned the truck Smith had been driving. Eventually, the
passengers and the college settled. However, because Smith, who had filed
a cross claim against that college, refused to withdraw his cross claim, the
Ninth Circuit found that Smith "elected to litigate the claim fully in tribal
court," thereby allowing the tribal court to keep jurisdiction under Montana's
first exception. °9 Rather than doing a simple and short formalistic analysis
declaring that the nonmember plaintiff had consented to jurisdiction by
electing not to dismiss his cross claim, the Ninth Circuit backed its holding
106. Id. (citation omitted).
107. For a forceful argument criticizing the Scalia approach on this issue, see Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Hicks, 533 U.S. at 392-94.
108. 434 F.3d 1127(9th Cir. 2006).
109. Id. at 1129. For a similar argument concerning enforcement of a consent agreement
between a member and a nonmember by a tribal court, see Fry v. Colville Tribal Court, No. CV-
07-0178-EFS, 2007 WL 2405002 (E. D. Wash. Aug. 17, 2007).
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with a lengthy functional analysis weighing different factors such as the
connection of the law suit to tribal lands, the Indian status of the defendant
college, and the general interest of the tribal court is exercising subject matter
jurisdiction in this case." 0
Another case that relied on the consensual exception to the Montana rule
was Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co. "' The Eighth
Circuit in that case held that the Cheyenne River Sioux tribal court had
jurisdiction over a law suit involving a contractual dispute between a tribal
member plaintiff and a non-Indian bank extending loans to reservation
businesses. After a jury trial in tribal court, the Bank was found liable for
discriminatory lending practices in its dealing with tribal members. One of the
Bank's arguments was that the consensual relation had only been with the
Long Company. Because Long Company was a race-neutral corporation
registered under the laws of South Dakota, it should not be considered as
having membership in the tribe for the purpose of determining tribal court
jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit stated that because the Bank "formed
concrete commercial relationships with the Indian owners of that corporation,
we conclude that it engaged on the kind of consensual relationship
contemplated by Montana. " ' The Eighth Circuit also found that unlike the
situation in Strate v. A-1 Contractors,"' where the highway traffic accident
between a nonmember and the nonmember defendant had nothing to do with
the contract the defendant had signed with the tribe," 4 in this case "the Longs'
discrimination claim arose directly from their preexisting relationship with the
bank.""' Therefore, Montana's consensual relation was applicable and the
tribal court had jurisdiction." 6
110. For an in depth analysis of the case, see Nicole E. Ducheneaux, Smith v. Salish
Kootenai College: Self-Determination as Governing Principle or Afterthought in Tribal Civil
Jurisdiction Jurisprudence, 68 MONT. L. REV. 211 (2007).
111. 491 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S.Ct. 829 (2008).
112. Id. at 886. In doing so, the Eighth Circuit took a different position than the one reached
by the Montana Supreme Court in Zempel v. Liberty, 143 P.3d 123 (Mont. 2006).
113. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
114. The Court in Strate stated that although A-I was engaged in subcontract work for the
Fort Berthold Reservation, and therefore had a "consensual relationship" with the Tribes, Gisela
Fredericks was not a party to the subcontract, and the Tribes were strangers to the accident. Id.
at 457.
115. Plains Commerce Bank, 491 F.3d at 887.
116. Besides the statements in Hicks and Strate, the Supreme Court addressed the consensual
relations exception to the Montana rule in only one other case, Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,
532 U.S. 645 (2001). In that case, the Court held that a nonmember's "receipt of tribal police,
fire, and medical services does not create the requisite connection" allowing tribal taxation of
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At the time of this writing, the Court had granted the petition of Cert in this
case but had not yet issued a decision. While the Court of Appeals' decision
relying on the consensual exception to the Montana rule in favor of tribal
jurisdiction seems to be on imminently sound legal grounds, it would not be
surprising if the Court once again used a formalist mode of analysis to
overturn the decision. As this article was going to the printer, the Supreme
Court issued its decision in Plains Commerce Bank. As predicted, the Court
reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision. The Court held that the tribal court did
not have jurisdiction over the case because it found that, at its core, the Longs
claim of discrimination was really a challenge to the power of the Bank to sell
its non-Indian fee land to another party and under Montana, a tribe lacks the
civil authority to regulate the sale of non-Indian fee land. Although the
decision could and should be limited to instances where a tribe is attempting
to regulate the sale of non-Indian fee land through its tort law, some language
used in the opinion seems to tie the consensual exception to instances where
tribal jurisdiction is needed for tribal self-government Thus the Court stated:
"Montana and its progeny permit tribal regulation of nonmember conduct
inside the reservation that implicates the tribe's sovereign interests. Montana
expressly limits its first exception to the activities of nonmembers, allowing
these to be regulated to the extent necessary to protect tribal self-government
[and] to control internal relations.""' 7
D. Summary of the Supreme Court's Implicit Divestiture Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court in Oliphant came up with a new rule which stated that
upon incorporation into the United States, Indian tribes became implicitly
divested of any inherent sovereign power "inconsistent with their status."' 18
The question remaining was not only how to determine what was inconsistent
with tribal status, but more importantly, who was going to make that decision.
The Oliphant Court first came up with what could have been a functional
standard when it took the position that the powers that were inconsistent with
such nonmember. Id. at 655. The Court also stated, "Montana's consensual relationship
exception requires that the tax or regulation imposed by the Indian tribe have a nexus to the
consensual relationship itself... .A nonmember's consensual relationship in one area thus does
not trigger tribal civil authority in another." Id. at 656.
117. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709, 2721
(2008) (citations omitted).
118. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208-09 (1978).
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tribal status were those that were in conflict with an overriding federal
interest.119
In Montana, however, the Court replaced this standard with a formal rule:
Indian tribes have been divested of any jurisdiction over nonmembers, at least
while on nonmember fee lands. This general rule was based on two related
formalistic concepts: First, it is inconsistent with tribal status for tribes to
independently determine their external relations, and second, by "external
relations," the Court meant any tribal relations dealing with nonmembers.
The Montana Court initially inserted a functional component to its analysis
coming up with an exception to its general Montana rule and stating that while
it was inconsistent with tribal status to exercise any power not necessary to
tribal self-government, tribal control of nonmembers may be necessary to
tribal self-government when the conduct of such nonmembers had a direct
impact on the economic security, political integrity or health and welfare of
the tribe. The Court's decisions in Strate and Hicks showed, however, that the
Court has all but nixed this Montana exception. Although I have argued
elsewhere that language in a later decision, United States v. Lara,"2 ' does not
seem consistent with prior cases and may indicate a revision in the Court's
implicit divestiture jurisprudence, 2' the following statement by Justice
Rehnquist in a 2001 case adequately summarized the Court's position in
implicit divestiture cases:
"[T]hrough their original incorporation into the United States as
well as through specific treaties and statues, Indian tribes have lost
many of the attribute of sovereignty." We concluded that the
inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes was limited to "their members
and their territory": "[e]xercise of tribal power beyond what is
necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal
119. As explained earlier, the Court in Oliphant determined that there was such a conflict
by analyzing the historical assumptions of the three branches of the federal government as well
as federal interests derived from the constitutional structure such as the interest in making sure
that United States citizens not be subject to unwarranted intrusion into their personal liberty.
120. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
121. See Skibine, Redefining the Status, supra note 6, at 677-82 (arguing that Justice
Breyers' statement in Lara that Indian tribes' loss of inherent tribal powers in Oliphant and
Duro were the result of "restrictions ... that the political branches of the government had
imposed on the tribes," Lara, 541 U.S. at 200, seems inconsistent with the Court's implicit
divestiture jurisprudence according to which many inherent tribal powers were lost upon the
Indian tribes' incorporation within the United States); see also Alex Tallchief Skibine, Dualism
and the Dialogic of Incorporation in Federal Indian Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 28 (2005),
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/119/decO5/skibine.pdf.
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relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes.'"
("The dependent status of Indian tribes . . . is necessarily
inconsistent with the freedom to determine their external
relations"). 22
As explained earlier, Scalia's opinion in Hicks indicated that in order to
acquire jurisdiction over nonmembers, the tribes may have to show that their
interest in self-government is "superior" to the states' interest in having
exclusive jurisdiction over these nonmembers. Because the Constitution's
Commerce Clause assigned to Congress the exclusive role of regulating
relations with Indian tribes, it would seem Congress should have the primary
role in indicating how these interests should be balanced. Yet the Court,
through the adoption of formalistic rules, has now assumed judicial supremacy
and is making such decisions not with congressional policies in mind, but
instead, with state policies and state interests in mind. In the next part, I turn
to these state interests and show how in determining the extent of state
jurisdiction inside Indian country, the Court has moved away from a
functional analysis - based on the balancing of tribal, federal, and state
interests - to an approach based on formalism favoring states' rights
III. Formalism in State Jurisdiction Cases
A: The Functionalist Years: From Infringement to Indian Preemption
States used to have nojurisdiction whatsoever within Indian reservations. 123
In its 1959 landmark decision in Williams v. Lee,'24 after examining some
precedents which had allowed a measure of state jurisdiction inside Indian
Country,121 the Court formulated a new test, which became known as the
"infringement test," stating "[e]ssentially, absent governing Acts of Congress,
the question has always been whether the state actions infringed on the right
of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."' 26 In
1973, McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona, appeared to have
replaced this test. The Court gave the first definition of the Indian preemption
test, stating
122. Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 650-51 (citation omitted).
123. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
124. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
125. The cases cited were Harrison v. Laveen, 196 P.2d 456 (Ariz. 1948), New York ex rel.
Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946), United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926), Felix
v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317 (1892), and Utah & Northern Railway v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885).
126. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
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The trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian
sovereignty as a bar to statejurisdiction, and toward the reliance on
federal preemption. The modem cases thus tend to avoid reliance
on platonic notion of Indian sovereignty and to look instead at the
applicable treaties and statutes which defines the limits of state
power.'27
The Court further elaborated on the nature of Indian preemption inquiry in
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,28 stating
This inquiry is not dependent on mechanical or absolute
conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but has called for a
particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal and tribal
interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the
specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate
federal law.'29
Although some later cases seemed to have acknowledged that the
infringement and preemption tests could co-exist, forming two distinct barriers
to the exercise of state jurisdiction inside Indian reservations, 30 the two tests
seemed to have been eventually merged into one flexible balancing inquiry.
This balancing approach represents a quintessential functional philosophy.
Thus in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, the Court declared "State
jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of federal law if it interferes or is
incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless
the State interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of State
authority."
13 1
The initial conception of the Indian preemption inquiry was largely
influenced by Justice Thurgood Marshall. His preemption analysis can be
divided into five factors or components. The first factor is whether the state
regulations will unduly interfere, or not be compatible with, an existing
federal regulatory scheme.' An equally important factor, however, is the
127. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (citation
omitted).
128. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
129. Id. at 145.
130. In Bracker, the Court stated, "The two barriers are independent because either standing
alone, can be a sufficient basis for holding state law inapplicable." Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142-43
(1980).
131. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1980).
132. Such an incompatibility was found in Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, where the State was trying
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"backdrop" of Indian sovereignty. 3 s A third factor is whether there is a nexus
between the state tax and state services. The fourth factor is whether the
"value" the state is trying to regulate or tax is generated on the reservation.
This factor seemed to have made a crucial difference between the Court's
refusal to allow state regulation of reservation casinos,' 34 as well as
regulations of hunting and fishing activities,'35 and its allowance of state
taxation of cigarette sales made to nonmembers.' 36 A fifth factor is whether
the activity the state is attempting to regulate has a spillover effect outside of
the reservation. For instance, such a spillover effect played a factor in the
Court's willingness to allow some state regulation of liquor sales on Indian
reservations in Rehner'37 Finally, the Court has also considered whether
tribal and state regulations could coexist or whether allowing state regulation
would in fact preempt tribal regulation. For instance, in Mescalero Apache
Tribe, the Court refused to allow state regulation of hunting and fishing,
stating "[i]t is important to emphasize that concurrent jurisdiction would
effectively nullify the Tribe's authority to control hunting and fishing on the
reservation." 38
Although the ultimate preemption inquiry looks at whether state
jurisdiction has been preempted by the operation of federal law, one must not
confuse a finding of congressional intent to preempt with Indian preemption.
Justice Marshall had stated for the Court that the preemption inquiry did not
focus solely on a congressional "intent" to preempt. His version of the
preemption inquiry was a flexible approach allowing preemption of state
jurisdiction even in the absence of a specific intent to preempt. 39 Justice
to tax nonmember loggers transporting forest product on reservation roads.
133. As the Court stated in Mescalero Apache Tribe, "The traditional notions of Indian
sovereignty provide a crucial 'backdrop' against which assertion of State authority must be
assessed." Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 334 (citation omitted). The lack of such
sovereignty backdrop was an important factor in allowing state jurisdiction in Mescalero
Apache Tribe and Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
134. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
135. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324.
136. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134
(1980).
137. Rehner, 463 U.S. at 724.
138. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 338.
139. Writing for the Court in Mescalero Apache Tribe, he stated,
By resting pre-emption analysis principally on a consideration of the nature of the
competing interests at stake, our cases have rejected a narrow focus on
congressional intent to pre-empt State law as the sole touchstone. They have also
rejected the proposition that preemption requires "an express congressional
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Rehnquist, however, always had a very different understanding of the Indian
preemption test. In a separate opinion written in Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Reservation,4 ° he objected to any balancing because
"[b]alancing of interests is not the appropriate gauge for determining validity
since it is that very balancing which we have reserved for Congress.'
' 4
'
Justice Rehnquist firmly believed that a specific congressional intent to
preempt was necessary. Thus he wrote,
I see no need for this Court to balance the state and tribal interests
in enacting particular forms of taxation in order to determine their
validity. Absent discrimination, the question is only one of
congressional intent. Either Congress intended to pre-empt the
state taxing authority or it did not.
42
When it comes to the preemption inquiry, the ultimate difference between
Marshall and Rehnquist can be seen as the contrast between a functional
approach-where various factors and congressional policies will be balanced
to figure out if state interests are sufficient to overcome a presumption against
state jurisdiction created by an historical context containing a backdrop of
tribal sovereignty - and a more formalistic approach, which creates a
presumption in favor of state jurisdiction and places the burden on the tribes
to show a congressional intent to preempt. However, since almost all of the
justices in the Rehnquist camp consider themselves textualists, shunning any
kind of quest for congressional intent, 43 that approach seems to require the
tribe to find specific statutory language preempting state jurisdiction.
Unfortunately for the tribe, although Justice Marshall's understanding of
Indian preemption initially carried the day,'" as the next section will show,
statement to that effect."
Id. at 334.
140. 447 U.S. 134 (1979).
141. Id. at 177.
142. Id. at 161. Rehnquist never gave up on his version of preemption. In a later case he
stated in a dissent, "[e]ven under the modified form of preemption doctrine applicable to state
regulation of reservation activities, there must be some affirmative indication that Congress did
not intend the State to exercise the sovereign power challenged in this suit." Ramah Navajo
School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832, 854-55 (1982).
143. On textualism as a theory of statutory interpretation, see generally William N. Eskridge,
Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990).
144. In addition to the earlier McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164
(1973), using Marshall's version of Indian preemption, the Court found state jurisdiction
preempted in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), Central
Machinery v. Arizona Tax Commission, 448 U.S. 160 (1980), Ramah Navajo School Board,
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Rehnquist's version of preemption seemed to have prevailed in the long run,
or at least, for the time being.
B. Mismanaging Preemption: Cotton Petroleum and Milhelm
In Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,'45 the issue was whether the
state could impose a severance tax on oil and gas produced by a non-Indian
whose income was generated from land he was leasing from the tribe within
the Mescalero Apache Indian reservation. The Court held that the state tax
was not preempted. The Court found no backdrop of tribal sovereignty or
immunity from such state taxes in this case, because even though the 1938
Indian Mineral Leasing Act did not permit nor preclude such states taxation,
an older Act of Congress had at one time removed the tax immunity
previously enjoyed by such non-Indian oil and gas producers on Indian
reservations.'46  Without such a backdrop of sovereignty creating a
presumption of preemption, the Court asked whether subsequent legislation
could be construed either explicitly or implicitly as preempting such state
taxation. Finding none, the Court held that the state tax had not been
preempted. Contrary to what it claimed,'47 the Court did not do any
comprehensive balancing of the interests, preferring instead to distinguish
previous cases on the ground that here, the state was providing some services
to the reservation. Perhaps the absence of a tribal sovereignty backdrop can
distinguish this case from others. However, Justice Blackmun, in dissent,
thought that the majority had given up on a true balancing of the interests,
stating
Instead of engaging in a careful examination of state, tribal and
federal interests ... the majority has adopted the principle of "the
inexorable zero". . . [u]nder the majority's approach, there is no
pre-emption unless the States are entirely excluded from a sphere
of activity and provide no services to the Indians or to the lessees
they seek to tax. 48
458 U.S. 832, Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, and California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
145. 490 U.S. 163 (1988).
146. Id. at 182-83.
147. Id. at 176 (stating that questions of preemption "are not 'controlled by mechanical and
absolute conceptions of state and tribal sovereignty,"' and have instead been resolved by the
application of "a flexible preemption analysis sensitive to the particular facts and legislation
involved").
148. Id. at 204 (citations omitted). Justice Blackmun went on to state, "Pre-emption analysis
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Furthermore, the dissenting opinion also noted that in finding that state
taxation here would not impose any economic burden on the tribe, the Court
blinded itself to the economics of oil and gas production.'49
The next preemption case on the Court's agenda, Department of Taxation
& Finance of New York v. Milhelm Attea & Bros. Inc.,' essentially
overturned two rather recent precedents, Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona
State Tax Commission,'' and Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax
Commission."2 In Milhelm Attea, the issue was whether the Indian Trader
statute'53 preempted state regulations which not only imposed a quota on the
amount of untaxed cigarettes registered wholesale traders could sell to
reservation Indian retailers but also imposed some substantial record keeping
requirements on such wholesalers."" In addition, these wholesalers had to
make sure that their buyers had a valid state tax exemption certificate, had to
make monthly statements reports to state agencies, and had to pre-collect taxes
on non-exempt sales.'55 While under Justice Thurgood Marshall's flexible
Indian preemption analysis, state jurisdiction was able to be preempted in the
absence of specific congressional intent to preempt, Milhelm can be
understood as standing for the proposition that state jurisdiction is not
preempted even when there seems to be clear indication of congressional
intent to preempt. Certainly, the Indian Trader statutes seemed rather clear.
They stated in part:
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall have the sole power and
authority to appoint traders to the Indian tribes and to make such
rules and regulations as he may deem just and proper, specifying
the kind and quantity of goods and the prices at which such goods
shall be sold to the Indians." 6
In allowing the state quota, licensing, and record keeping regulations to
stand, the Court seemed to have been motivated by essentially pragmatic
calls for a close consideration of conflicting interests and of their potential impact on one
another.... The [majority's] exclusion of all sense of proportion has led to a result that is
antithetical to the concerns that animate our Indian preemption jurisprudence." Id. at 208.
149. Id. at 208-09.
150. 512 U.S. 61 (1994).
151. 380 U.S. 685 (1965)
152. 448 U.S. 160 (1980).
153. Act of Aug. 18, 1876, ch. 289, 19 Stat. 200 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 261 (2000)).
154. MilhelmAttea, 512 U.S. at 64.
155. Id. at 67.
156. Id. at 70 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 261) (emphasis added).
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reasons, albeit very subjective ones. Thus, the Court had already held in
previous cases that states could tax cigarette sales made on Indian reservations
to nonmembers.' 57 It also had held, however, that a state could not sue a tribe
to collect such taxes because Indian tribes have sovereign immunity from
suit.' So the dilemma was: how can the state collect their lawful tax? The
obvious answer should have been: let the Congress amend the Indian Trader
statutes or abrogate the tribe's immunity from suit in such instances.' But
that would mean deferring to Congress on issues dealing with federalism,
Indian tribes, and states' rights. The Court would have none of that, preferring
instead to assume judicial supremacy and allow the state's regulations even
if this meant overturning two recent precedents, sub silentio.
C. Preempting Preemption in State Regulation of Nonmembers
As shown in Part II, the Court in cases such as Brendale, Strate, and Hicks,
has used the implicit divestiture doctrine as an alternative test to both preempt
tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers while at the same time implicitly
affirming the existence of state jurisdiction in those cases. In this section, I
focus on another method used by the Court to privilege state over tribal
regulations: declaring that the event the state is trying to regulate never
occurred on the reservation.
1. The Indian Country Cases
Although this article is about how federal Indian common law has been
recently reshaped by formalism, it should be noted that the Court has also
allowed state jurisdiction or prevented tribal jurisdiction by holding, as a
matter of statutory construction, that land previously considered "Indian
country,"'60 was no longer so.' 6 ' In the area of statutory construction, the
157. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134 (1980).
158. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505
(1991).
159. For sure, this is the remedy the Court has suggested in many cases to tribes that have
been on the losing end of cases. For instance, in Oliphant, after holding that tribes had no
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, the Court took the position that whether Indian tribes
need criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in order to effectively fight crimes on reservations
are "considerations for Congress to weigh." Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,
212(1978).
160. The term "Indian Country" is a term of art. It is defined by federal statute as: "(a) all
lands within the limit of any Indian reservations under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government..., (b) all dependent Indian Communities within the borders of the United
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proxy for formalism has been the use of "textualism" as a method or theory
of statutory interpretation.'62 In a 1990 article, Professor Philip Frickey had
put forth the argument that instead of more foundationalist theories such as
intentionalism or textualism, the Court's analysis in statutory construction
cases in federal Indian law reflected what he termed "practical reasoning. ' 63
Concerning cases involving the existence of Indian country, Frickey argued
that although these decisions purport to rely solely on "clear evidence of
congressional intent" to end reservation status, these decisions cannot be
explained solely in those terms. Frickey showed how these cases were
actually decided on practical reasoning reflecting the dynamic nature of the
Court's interpretation. 164
The most recent cases in this area of the law, all decided after Frickey
published his landmark article, are Hagen v. Utah, 65 South Dakota v. Yankton
Sioux Tribe,'66 and Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government.167
All three cases involved assertion ofjurisdiction over nonmembers. In Hagen,
the State of Utah was trying to prosecute a nonmember for distributing a
controlled substance. 61 In Yankton, the Yankton Tribe was trying to regulate
a nonmember's solid waste disposal facility located on nonmember fee land.1
69
Finally in Venetie, the tribe attempted to tax a nonmember entity building a
school on land owned by the tribe.' 70 In Hagen and Yankton, the Court held
that the part of the reservation where the nonmember or his property was had
been disestablished by acts of Congress. In Venetie, the Court held that as a
result of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), 171 the land
owned by the Native Village of Venetie could not qualify as a dependent
Indian community and therefore was no longer Indian country.
States . . . , and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian title to which have not been
extinguished .... 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000).
161. For an analysis on how the Court has accomplished this, see Robert Laurence, The
Unseemly Nature ofReservation Diminishment by Judicial, as Opposed to Legislative Fiat and
the Ironic Role of the Indian Civil Right Act in Limiting Both 71 N.D.L. REv. 393 (1995).
162. See Molot, supra note 13.
163. Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, PracticalReasoning, andthe Dynamic Nature
of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1137 (1990).
164. Id. at 1148-50.
165. 510 U.S. 399 (1994).
166. 522 U.S. 329 (1998).
167. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
168. Hagen, 510 U.S. 399.
169. Yankton, 522 U.S. at 329.
170. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 520.
171. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (2000).
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Continuing the trend identified by Professor Frickey, the Hagen decision's
analysis concerning congressional intent to disestablish the Ute reservation is
unconvincing, to say the least. The Court's growing formalism can be seen
in its increasing use of textualism and its reliance on statutory words
purporting to convey clear indications of congressional intent. In Hagen, the
Court relied heavily on the fact that under a 1902 Act of Congress, "all the
unallotted land lands within said reservation shall be restored to the public
domain."' 172 Although the Court gave talismanic importance to the words
"restored to the public domain" to find clear evidence of congressional intent,
these words do not actually say the reservation status of these lands had been
terminated. As argued by the dissent, the legislative record was ambiguous
at best, and therefore the case should have been decided based on the canon
of statutory interpretation which requires ambiguous expressions to be
resolved in the tribe's favor.'73 The Yankton case, even more clearly, reflects
increased reliance on textualism. The Court in Yankton thought that the
statute's plain term evidenced a clear congressional intent to disestablish the
reservation. As the Court stated, "we perceive congressional intent to
diminish the reservation in the plain statutory language."' 74
The issue in Venetie was whether land owned by the tribe constituted a
dependent Indian community.'75 Justice Thomas's opinion represents a
classical use of form over substance. Reversing the court of appeals that had
used a six factor functional balancing test to determine the lands to be part of
a dependent Indian community,' 16 the Supreme Court held that the lands could
not be part of a dependent Indian community because they were set aside
under ANCSA, 77 an Act of Congress that had the purpose of terminating the
dependency of the Native Communities on the federal government. The Court
172. Hagen, 510 U.S. at 404.
173. See id. at 422-27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In addition, it has to be noted that
although these key words were contained in the 1902 Act, they were omitted from the 1905 Act
that finally allotted the reservation. However, this fact was judged not to be particularly
meaningful to the Court.
174. Yankton, 522 U.S. at 344-45, 351. The court stated "Article I of the 1894 Act provides
that the Tribe will "cede, sell, and relinquish, and convey to the United States all their claim,
right, title, and interest in and to all the unallotted lands within the limits of the reservation";
pursuant to Article II, the United States pledges a fixed payment of $600,000 in return. This
"cession" and "sum certain" language is "precisely suited" to terminating reservation status."
175. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 523.
176. Alaska ex reL. Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Vill. Of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 101 F.3d
1286, 1292-94 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
177. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (2000).
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justified this finding by adopting a rather formalistic definition of the term
"dependent Indian community," stating,
We now hold that [dependent Indian community] refers to a
limited category of Indian lands that are neither reservations nor
allotments, and that satisfy two requirements - first, they must
have been set aside by the Federal Government for the use of the
Indians as Indian land; second, they must be under federal
superintendence.'
Using this kind of formal definition, the Court was able to ignore the
realities on the ground - the fact that these lands were located in isolated
Native communities with whom the United States maintained a trust
relationship. It also allowed the Court to ignore the fact that ANCSA was
amended in 1987,179 to provide for the continuance of the trust relationship
between the Native Alaskan Tribes and the United States. 8° Even more
disturbing from a normative viewpoint is Justice Thomas's insistence on the
"dependent" nature of the Indian community. Thus, after stating that "the
federal superintendence requirement guarantees that the Indian community is
sufficiently "dependent" on the Federal Government,"'' he concluded that
there was not enough "indicia of active federal control over the Tribe's land
sufficient to support a finding of federal superintendence."' 82 In other words,
what is important to Thomas is not the federal policy of tribal self-government
or the fact that this was a very native and isolated community, but the degree
of power and control the federal government exercised in the management of
these lands. The normative implications of this holding seems to be that
according to the Court, the primary factor in determining the existence of
Indian country should be the degree of federal control exercised and not the
178. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 527. At least one state supreme court has since adopted a slightly
different position, holding that at least in the case of the Pueblos in New Mexico, a reservation
could also qualify as a dependent Indian community. See New Mexico v. Romero, 142 P.3d
887, 891 (N.M. 2006) (citing Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998)).
179. See Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-241,
101 Stat. 1788.
180. For a critical evaluation of the Court's reasoning in Venetie, see David M. Burton,
Canons of Construction, Stare Decisis, and Dependent Indian Communities: A Test ofJudicial
Integrity, 16 ALASKA L. REV. 37 (1998); see also Kristen Carpenter, Interpreting Indian
Country in State ofAlaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 35 TULSA L.J. 73 (1999).
181. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 531.
182. Id. at 534.
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fact that these lands have been under the control of sovereign tribes since time
immemorial.
2. Wagnon v. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Nation83
The issue in Wagnon was whether the State of Kansas could impose an
excise tax on fuel sold by a non-Indian distributor to the Prairie Band of
Potawatomi Nation.' The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had ruled
against the state tax using a traditional balancing preemption test." 5 Using a
formalistic approach, the Supreme Court in Wagnon written by Justice
Thomas, reversed. Looking only at the words of the tax statute to find that it
was meant to tax the receipt of the fuel by the distributor and not its
subsequent sale to the tribe, the Court took the position that the functional
balancing test was not applicable because the tax incurred by the non-Indian
distributor occurred off the reservation. Thomas's penchant for formalism
was clearly reflected in the last part of his opinion, where he stated, "The
application of the interest-balancing test to the Kansas motor fuel tax is not
only inconsistent with the special geographic sovereignty concerns that gave
rise to that test, but also with our efforts to establish a 'bright line standard[s]'
in the context of tax administration."' 86
This formalistic approach allowed the Court to ignore the reality of the
situation and congressional policies.8 7 In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg noted
that although the tax was formally imposed on the non-Indian distributor, in
reality, the tax burdened reservation activities. According to her, the tax
should have been considered as having taken place on the Indian reservation
because under the applicable statute, "[t]o whom and where the distributor
sells are the criteria that determine the 'transactions' on which '[n]o tax is...
imposed, and correspondingly the transaction on which the tax is imposed""8 8
183. 546 U.S. 95 (2005).
184. Id. at 101-02.
185. Prairie Bank of Potawatomi Nation v. Richards, 379 F.3d 979, 983 (10th Cir. 2004),
rev'd, 546 U.S. 95 (2005).
186. Wagnon, 546U.S. at 113.
187. For an analysis of the case making a similar point, see Timothy R. Hurley, Comment,
Elevating Form over Substance at the Expense oflndian Sovereignty [Wagnon v. Prairie Band
Potawatomi Nation, 126 S.Ct. 676 (2005)], 46 WASHBuRN L.J. 453 (2007).
188. Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 123-124. Justice Ginsburg also disagreed with the Court's
position that the State could avoid the balancing test by just legislatively switching the legal
incidence of the tax to the non-Indian.
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Another instance where the Court showed its blindness of the economic
realities on the ground occurred when Justice Thomas asserted that the tribe's
"[d]ecision to impose a tax should have no effect on its net revenues from the
operation of the station."'8 9 As Justice Ginsburg noted in dissent:"[a]s a
practical matter, however, the two tolls cannot coexist."' 9° Justice Ginsburg
also provided a persuasive explanation as to why a functional balancing test
is more appropriate in these circumstances:
Balancing tests have been criticized as rudderless, affording
insufficient guidance to decisionmakers. Pointed as the criticism
may be, one must ask, as in life's choices generally, what is the
alternative. The principle of tribal self-government, grounded in
notions of inherent sovereignty and in congressional policies, seeks
an accommodation between the interests of the Tribes, and the
Federal Government, on the one hand, and those of the State, on
the other. No "bright line" test is capable of achieving such an
accommodation with respect to state taxes formally imposed on
non-Indians, but impacting on-reservation ventures. '9
One of the most problematic aspects of the Court's formalistic approach is
that it may put an end to the proliferation of recently enacted tribal-state
agreements. 92 As stated by Justice Ginsburg:"[b]y truncating the balancing-
of-interests approach, the Court has diminished prospects for cooperative
efforts to achieve resolution of taxation issues through constructive
intergovernmental agreements."' 93 While these tribal-state agreements have
proliferated, it is true that they are not standardized. As a result, it is very
possible that some agreements may be beneficial to tribes, 94 while others may
not. 9 Nevertheless, these compacts are useful.' 96 Their very existence,
189. Id. at ll4.
190. Id. at 116 (citing Prairie Band, 379 F.3d at 986).
191. Id. at 124-25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
192. See JEFFREY D. ASHLEY & SECODY J. HUBBARD, NEGOTIATED SOVEREIGNTY: WORKING
TO IMPROVE TRIBAL-STATE RELATIONS (2004).
193. Wagnon, 546 U.S. at 131 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
194. See Richard J. Annson, Jr., State Taxation of Non-Indians Whom Do Business with
Indian Tribes: Why Several Recent Ninth Circuit Holdings Reemphasize the Need for Indian
Tribes to Enter into Taxation Compacts with Their Respective State, 78 OR. L. REV. 501 (1999).
195. For a scholarly debate on the merits of such agreements, see Matthew L.M. Fletcher,
Reviving Local Tribal Control in Indian Country, FEDERAL LAWYER, Mar./Apr. 2006, at 38,
and Ezra Rosser, Caution, Cooperative Agreements, and the Actual State of Things: A Reply
to Professor Fletcher, 42 TULSA L. REV. 57 (2006)
196. See Frank Pommersheim, Tribal State Relations: Hopefor the Future?, 36 S.D. L. REv.
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however, is due to the fact that Congress has not acted specifically in this area
and that, until recently, the Court had used a functional test which gave some
leeway for the states and the tribes to negotiate mutually agreeable solutions.
One of the trends that can be identified as a result of the Court's formalism,
is the reliance on non federal Indian law principles by some lower courts. In
other words, faced with an incoherent federal Indian law jurisprudence
resulting from the Court's switch from functional standards to more
formalistic rules, some lower courts have opted to use legal analysis derived
from other areas of the law. A case illustrating this trend is another Wagnon
case, Prairie Band of Potawatomi Nation v. Wagnon. 197 In that case, a tribe
was seeking to have the State of Kansas recognize the validity of its license
plates so that tribal members would not have to purchase additional plates
issued by the state. Although when initially deciding the case the Tenth
Circuit had relied on a preemption balancing test, ultimately ruling in the
tribe's favor,'98 upon remand from the Supreme Court, it again ruled in the
tribe's favor but abandoned Indian preemption and relied on equal protection
jurisprudence.' 99 Thus, after finding that "with the exception of Iran and
possibly Cuba... the State recognizes and is willing to accept registration and
titling by practically every jurisdiction except in the case of Kansas-based
Indian tribes,"2 °" the Tenth Circuit found that the sole reason given by Kansas
for such different treatment, public safety, was unconvincing. This was
especially true in light of the fact that Kansas was recognizing license plates
issued by non Kansas-based tribes, thus boosting the court's conclusion that
Kansas "impermissibly discriminates against similarly situated sovereigns."201
D. State Regulation of Tribes and Tribal Members
When it comes to state tax authority over tribal members or tribes, the
Court stated, in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation,
239(1991).
197. 476 F.3d 818 (10th Cir. 2007).
198. See Prairie Bank of Potawatomi Nation v. Wagnon, 402 F.3d 1015. 1028 (10th Cir.
2005), vacated, 546 U.S. 1072 (2005).
199. This mode of analysis had been initially suggested before the Supreme Court remand
in the concurring opinion. See id. at 1028-31 (McConnell, J., concurring).
200. Prairie Bank, 476 F.3d at 825 (citations omitted).
201. Id. at 827. The same argument had been made earlier by the Ninth Circuit in Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians v. Smith, 388 F.3d 691 (9th Cir. 2004), where the court used an equal
protection argument to prevent the state from ticketing tribal police cars with light bars. These
tribal police cars had to travel on off-reservation state highways to go from one portion of the
reservation to another.
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[W]hen a State attempts to levy a tax directly on an Indian tribe or
its members inside Indian country, rather than on non-Indians, we
have employed, instead of a balancing inquiry, "a more categorical
approach: 'Absent cession ofjurisdiction or other federal statutes
permitting it,'... a State is without power to tax reservation lands
and reservation Indians. 2 °2
Therefore, in such cases, a formalistic rule has been adopted for the benefit of
tribal members. In this section, I show how the Court has managed to avoid
giving tribes and their members the benefit of such formal rule by
superimposing other formalistic approaches in order to rule in favor of state
jurisdiction.
1. The "Legal Incidence of the Tax'" Cases
The Court in Chickasaw also held that a crucial issue in such cases was
determining upon whom the "legal incidence" of the tax fell: the members or
the nonmembers. 2 3 If the legal incidence fell on the tribal members, the
categorical approach should be used, while if it fell on the nonmembers, the
functional balancing preemption inquiry should be used. Although the Court
in Chickasaw found that the legal incidence of the tax fell on the tribe in that
particular case, it unfortunately seems to have adopted a highly formalistic
approach, leaving to state legislatures almost full discretion to determine that
the nonmember entity bears the legal incidence of the tax when in fact, the
real economic burden falls on the tribe or tribal members.
Fortunately for the tribes, it seems that at least some lower federal courts
have re-inj ected functionalism within the formalist framework adopted by the
Supreme Court in such cases. For instance, in Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho
v. Hammond,2 4 the Ninth Circuit undertook a comprehensive multi-factored
analysis before determining that the legal incidence of the tax fell on the tribal
members. Starting its analysis by stating that "[t]he incidence of a state tax
on a sovereign Indian nation inescapably is a question of federal law that
cannot be conclusively resolved in and of itself by the state legislature's mere
statement," 205 the Hammond court took the position that a state's legislature
"intent" could not be ultimately dispositive because "[i]f the legislature could
202. 515 U.S. 450,458 (1995) (quoting County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 258 (1992)).
203. Id. at 457-61.
204. 384 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 2004).
205. Id. at 682-83.
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indirectly tax Indian nations merely by reciting ipsofacto that the incidence
of the tax was on another party, it would wholly undermine the Supreme
Court's precedent that taxing Indians is impermissible absent clear
congressional authorization. 20 6 Ultimately, basing its holding on a multi-
factored analysis,0 7 the Hammond court concluded that the state statute in
question retained "the 'pass through' quality of the prior statute" and that,
therefore, it retained its character as a "'collect and remit' scheme which
places the incidence of the tax on the Indian retailers."' '
2. State Taxation of Indian Owned Fee Land
Another controversial issue has been the states' attempts to tax Indian
owned fee lands within Indian reservations. For instance, in County of Yakima
v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation2" the Court used
a textualist approach to hold that the language of the General Allotment Act
of 1887 (GAA)21 ° explicitly authorized state taxation of Indian owned land
after the expiration of the trust period. As amended by the Burke Act of
206. Id. at 683. Later in its opinion the court also remarked that allowing the states to
arbitrarily designate who bore the legal incidence of the tax "would permit states indirectly to
threaten the very existence of the Tribes." Id. at 684.
207. Id. at 688. The court found first that the Kansas law required the non-tribal distributor
"to pass on and collect the tax from the [tribal] retailer," id. at 685; second, that the state statute
provided the non-tribal distributor with tax credits for collecting and remitting the tax to the
states, id. at 686; third, that the state gave tax credits to the non-tribal distributor for fuel taxes
that the distributor paid but could not collect from the tribal retailer, id. at 687; fourth, that
while the tribal retailers had a right to a refund for fuel taxes sought by distributors and paid by
the retailers, the retailers could neither set off their liability when consumers failed to pay the
tax, nor could they be paid by the state for collecting the tax for the state, id.
208. Id. at 688 (citation omitted). While other courts have followed the Hammond court's
approach in ruling in the tribes' favor, see Squaxin Island Tribe v. Stephens, No. C03-395 1 Z,
2006 WL 278559 (W.D. Wash 2006) (reconsidered in light of Wagnon but still reaching the
same result), this does not mean that the legislative intentions to place the legal incidence of a
tax on nonmember consumers is not important. Thus, in Keewanaw Bay Indian Community v.
Rising, 477 F.3d 881 (6th Cir. 2007), after stating that "[i]t is worth noting at the outset that the
Supreme Court has put great weight on expressions of legislative intent in determining where
the legal incidence of a tax falls," id. at 888, the court found that the legal incidence of the tax
fell on the nonmember consumers. In Keewanaw Bay, however, the Sixth Circuit did not limit
itself to the legislature's intent but also cited Hammond in stating that "[e]ven so, if the actual
operation of the tax contravenes the expressed legislative purpose, it would make little sense to
rely entirely on a statement of legislative intent .... "Id.
209. 502 U.S. 251 (1992).
210. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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1906, H section 6 of the General Allotment Act provided that "[a]t the
expiration of the trust period and when the lands have been conveyed to the
Indians by patent in fee.., then each and every allottee shall have the benefit
of and be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory
in which they may reside.... ." Further language also provided that as soon
as a fee patent was issued to an Indian allottee by the Secretary of the Interior:
"[T]hereafter all restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or taxation of said land
shall be removed. ''21 2 In this case, however, it was the Tribe that had
reacquired the lands that had been previously allotted to individual Indians.
Since the language of the statute did not specifically address that situation, the
tribe argued that it was exempt from state taxation, especially since the GAA
should be interpreted in light of the subsequent repudiation of the policies
underlying it.213
The other landmark Supreme Court decision in this area of the law is Cass
County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians.214 The issue in Cass County
was whether the county could tax fee land owned by tribal members within the
Leech Lake Band's reservation.2 5 Unlike the Yakima case, however, the
Leech Lake Band's reservation was not allotted pursuant to the GAA as
amended by the Burke Act but by the Nelson Act of 1889.216 Unlike the Burke
Act, the Nelson Act did not contain any language that could even remotely be
interpreted as an express congressional authorization to tax such lands.
Nevertheless, Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the
County could proceed with the tax because Congress had made its intent to
allow such tax "unmistakably clear. ' 2 17
What is interesting about this opinion is how Thomas, an avowed textualist,
came to his conclusion. He first managed to convince himself that the Yakima
court did not rely on the express reference to taxability contained in the Burke
Act. His only evidence for that interpretation seems to be a statement in
Yakima to the effect that the Court in Goudy v. Meath , 21 had found such
Indian fee land taxable "without even mentioning the Burke Act., 2 19
211. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (2000).
212. Id.
213. These policies were repudiated by Congress in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,
ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 461 (2000)).
214. 524 U.S. 103 (1998).
215. Id. at 106.
216. Ch. 24, 25 Stat. 642.
217. Cass County, 524 U.S. at 106.
218. 203 U.S. 146 (1906).
219. Cass County, 524 U.S. at 112-13 (quoting Yakima, 502 U.S. at 259).
No. 21
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Therefore, according to Justice Thomas, the Yakima Court must have
understood that "it was the alienability of the allotted land that the [Goudy]
Court found of central significance.""22 It seems that textualism would call for
this "unmistakably clear" meaning to be derived from the words of the statute
or at least, from its structure. Instead, Justice Thomas supported his
conclusion by invoking a general "rule" that he derived from the Goudy case
that dealt with another Act of Congress. That rule was that whenever
Congress allows Indians to freely alienate their lands, it must intend the states
to be able to tax such lands.22" '
The first problem with this reasoning is that it has to overcome some direct
language in the Yakima opinion stating that it relied on specific language in
the Burke Act concerning taxability of the land. For instance, the Yakima
Court had stated, "We agree with the Court of Appeals. that by specifically
mentioning immunity from land taxation 'as one of the restrictions that would
be removed upon conveyance in fee,' Congress in the Burke Act proviso
'manifested a clear intention to permit the state to tax' such Indian lands." '222
Secondly, the Yakima Court's position seems to have been that the law had
evolved since Goudy. That is why Justice Scalia, when writing for the Court
in Yakima, observed that although an older case, Goudy, had found that even
section 5 of the GAA had allowed such state taxation; 223 he went on to state
that more recent cases established "a consistent practice of declining to find
that Congress has authorized state taxation unless it has 'made its intention to
do so unmistakably clear., 224 Therefore, it seems that Scalia's position was
that although the Court now seemed to be requiring clearer indication of
congressional intent than at the time of Goudy, the express reference to
taxation in the Burke Act overcame this obstacle.
Thomas's reasoning boils down to this: First, other legislation, section 5
of the GAA, had been interpreted in 1906 as allowing state taxation of Indian
fee land because of its alienability. Secondly, section 6 of the GAA was
eventually amended (by the Burke Act) to specifically allow state taxation.
Therefore, congressional intent to allow similar taxation in the 1889 Nelson
Act could be inferred by importing a purpose borrowed from the 1906 Burke
220. Id. at 113 (quoting Yakima, 502 U.S. at 263).
221. Id.atlIO-11.
222. Yakima, 502 U.S. at 259 (quoting Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation
v. County of Yakima, 903 F.2d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 1990).
223. The issue in Yakima was whether section 6, as amended by the Burke Act, allowed state
taxation. The issue in Goudy was whether section 5 authorized such taxation. This is why
Goudy was not directly on point in Yakima.
224. Yakima, 502 U.S. at 258 (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985)).
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Act. As one scholar noted, Thomas the textualist had become Thomas, the
purposivist. 2 In fact, this appraisal of Thomas seems overly generous.
Thomas in Cass County not only resurrected Goudy, a 1906 opinion about
section 5 of the GAA, as the leading case in this area of the law, but also
extended its reasoning to a new situation involving the Nelson Act. In effect,
Thomas in Cass County reverted back to rules prevailing before the legal
realism movement. His approach is nothing less than a throwback to an
outdated version of legal positivism which prevailed during colonial times.226
Some lower courts seemed to have found ways to avoid the irrationality of
the rules laid down by the Supreme Court in Cass County. For instance, in
Keewanaw Bay Indian Community v. Naftaly,227 the Sixth Circuit was able to
distinguish Cass County by taking the position that land that had become
alienable through a treaty could not be compared to Indian land that became
alienable as a result of an Act of Congress.22 In Gobin v. Snohomish
County,2 29 the issue was not state taxation but zoning regulation that the
county was trying to impose on a tribal member's fee land within the
reservation. The court held that zoning regulations could not be equated to
taxing regulations and therefore Yakima and Cass County were not
controlling.23°
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation23' represents a case where the
Court was able to avoid either the functional balancing preemption inquiry,
or any approach mandating clear indication of congressional intent, in order
to allow state taxation of reservation Indians. At issue in the case was whether
the City of Sherill could impose a tax on properties the Oneida Indian Nation
(OIN) had recently purchased on the open market.232 Although the Oneida
Nation held fee simple title to these lands, the Nation claimed that the lands
were still within its ancestral reservation and therefore could not be taxed by
the city.
225. See Michael Dorf, Foreword: the Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV.
4, 6 n.9 (1998).
226. See Raban, supra note 23.
227. 452 F.3d 514 (6th Cir. 2006).
228. The court also had to distinguish two lower court cases that did find taxability even
though the land had become alienated initially through a treaty. See Lummi Indian Tribe v.
Whatcom County, 5 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1993); Thompson v. County of Franklin, 314 F.3d 79
(2d Cir. 2002).
229. 304 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2002).
230. Id., at 916.
231. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
232. Id.
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The two pivotal issues argued at the court of appeals were first, whether the
1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek,233 signed between the OIN and the United
States, had terminated the reservation guaranteed in an earlier treaty signed
between the United States and the Six Nations Iroquois Confederacy in
1794.234 Secondly, the State of New York was arguing that at some point late
in the nineteenth century, the Oneida Nation of New York had ceased to exist
as a federally recognized Indian tribe, thereby terminating any rights it may
have had in previous treaties. The Second Circuit held that the original 1794
reservation was not abolished by the 1838 treaty and the Oneida Nation had
never ceased to exist as an Indian tribe.235 Therefore, the lands recently
purchased by the Nation were still within an Indian reservation and not taxable
by the City.
The Supreme Court reversed.236 Ignoring the arguments made by the
attorneys from both sides in their briefs, the grounds on which the court of
appeals had made its decision, as well as the questions which had been
formally presented for review,237 the Court stated
The wrongs of which OIN complains in this action occurred during
the early years of the Republic. For the past two centuries, New
York and its county and municipal units have continuously
governed the territory. The Oneidas did not seek to regain
possession of their aboriginal lands by court decree until the
1970's. And not until the 1990's did OIN acquire the properties in
question and assert its unification theory to ground its demand for
exemption of the parcels from local taxation. This long lapse of
time, during which the Oneidas did not seek to revive their
sovereign control through equitable relief in court, and the
attendant dramatic changes in the character of the properties,
preclude OIN from gaining the disruptive remedy it now seeks.238
In the end, the Court held that three equitable doctrines - laches,
impossibility, and acquiescence - prevented the Oneidas from claiming that
their property could not be taxed by the City.239 City of Sherrill seems to be
233. Treaty with the New York Indians, Jan. 15, 1838, 7 Stat. 550.
234. Treaty of Canandaigua, Nov. 11, 1794, 7 Stat. 44.
235. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 212.
236. Id. at 221.
237. See Curtis Berkey, Recent Development, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 30
AM. INDLAN L. REV. 373 (2005-2006).
238. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 216-17.
239. Id. at 197.
434 [Vol. 32
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol32/iss2/2
FORMALISM & JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
one of those cases law professors are not eager to talk about because it is so
totally devoid of any doctrinal coherence, or easy classification." ° One
commentator concluded that the Court's opinion in City of Sherrill lacked
both doctrinal coherence and pragmatism, and represented a case of "blaming
the victim."24' For certain there was no doctrinal coherence.2 42 Whether the
Court's action lacked pragmatism is a more difficult question, and I am not so
sure I agree. It was authored by Justice Ginsburg, who, one year later, argued
so persuasively and coherently in her Wagnon dissent why functional
balancing tests should be used to measure the amount of state taxation inside
Indian reservations.243
Although there are many grounds on which the decision has been
criticized, 244 I will focus here on what could have been at least one important
reason the Court refused to uphold the tribe's traditional immunity from state
taxation.2 45 Professor Sarah Krakoff observed that City ofSherrill represented
the Court's effort to force the Indian tribes to remain dependent on the United
States.246 Thus she noted that the Court mentioned that OIN could have
240. One scholar has remarked that it is hard for a law professor not to just say "Arrrgh!"
when commenting about the decision. See Sarah Krakoff, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian
Nation of New York: A Regretful Postscript to the Taxation Chapter in Cohen s Handbook of
Federal Indian Law, 41 TULSA L. REV. 5, 10-11 (2005).
241. See Berkey, supra note 237, at 383.
242. I do not believe, as some have erroneously argued, that the tribal claim in Sherrill can
be described as a claim of reparative justice for ancient wrongs and therefore, better suited for
a legislative resolution. To start with, the claim was for an immunity from state taxation today
for lands only recently reacquired by the tribe. Secondly, for any legislative solution to have
had any chance of being enacted, it would have had to come before the Court's decision rather
than after. Thus it seems somewhat disingenuous, or completely oblivious to current political
realities, to argue for a solution that has no chance of coming about, precisely as a result of the
Court's decision. See The Supreme Court, 2004 Term: Leading Cases, Availability of
Equitable Relief, 119 HARV. L. REV. 347, 356-57 (2005).
243. Wagnon v. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 116-31 (2005).
244. For some insightful criticisms, see Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law:
Title, Possession, and Sacred Obligations 38 CoNN. L. REV. 605 (2006).
245. In doing so, I realize that assigning more complex reasons and motives to the Court may
give too much credit to the Court and deflect the discussion away from what really is just
ruthless pragmatism. Yet, I will, for the time being, resist, the strong temptation to simply argue
that the Court seemed to have relied on what could be called the "whatever" principle, meaning
whatever it takes to rule against the tribes and in favor of state interests.
246. See Krakoff, supra note 240, at 18. Noting the tribes' recent success in attaining self
sufficiency through economic development, Krakoff also observed that "Tribal success on the
ground is thus in direct disproportion to tribal success in the Highest Court. Id. at 19. Another
commentator noted the same trend and, pointing to City of Sherrill as a case on point, argued
that this change of attitude on behalf of the Court may be a result of the disproportionate success
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avoided state taxation by simply asking the Bureau of Indian Affairs to place
these lands in trust. Once lands are placed in trust, the United States, as the
trustee for the tribes, is said to have legal title to the lands while the tribes
have the beneficial title. As such the United States retains a certain amount
of control over such lands. Similarly, I have argued elsewhere that an analysis
of the Rehnquist Court in its last twenty five years or so showed that it has
adopted a "dependency paradigm" governing the incorporation of tribes into
the United States political system.247 According to this paradigm of
incorporation, the main reason Indian tribes are allowed to survive as quasi-
sovereign entities within the United States political system is not that they
have a right to self-determination and have always been recognized as quasi-
sovereign entities, but that they are a weak and "dependent" people and cannot
survive without being controlled by their "trustee," the United States.2 41
Similarly, other scholars have pointed to the existence of two versions of the
trust relationship, a "sovereign trust," advocated initially by Chief Justice
Marshall in his two Cherokee cases, and a "guardian-ward trust," which was
a product of the allotment/assimilation policies prevailing between the 1880's
and the 1920's.249 Sadly, it seems that most justices on the Court today have
reverted back to a "guardian-ward" vision of the trust relationship.50
Conclusion
The title to this article contains a reference to judicial supremacy. Congress
is said to have plenary power over Indian affairs; thus one would think that
Congress would be the primary mover in determining the relationship between
the tribes and the states when it comes to determining jurisdiction in Indian
Country. In reality, this has not turned out to be the case. Using a formalistic
of Indian gaming, see Joshua L. Sohn, The Double-Edged Sword ofIndian Gaming, 42 TULSA
L. REV. 139, 161-67 (2006).
247. See Skibine, Redefining the Status, supra note 6.
248. See, for instance, Justice Thomas' opinion in Venetie, 522 U.S. 520.
249. See Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty, The
Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 1471, 1476-1505.
250. For instance, Justice Thomas in his dissenting opinion in United States v. White
Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 483 n.. 1 (2003), quoted with approval the following
language from the Court of Claims :" "... the general relationship between Indian tribes and [the
United States] traditionally has been understood to be one in the nature of a guardian-ward
relationship. A Guardianship is not a trust."(quoting from Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v.
United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 565, 173 (1990). For a modem Indian vision of what the trust
relationship should be, see Kevin Gover, An Indian Trustfor the Twenty-First Century, 46 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 317 (2006).
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framework, the Court has become the primary institution that determines
jurisdictional relationships on Indian reservations. Of course, Congress could
change that. In an important case, United States v. Lara,25 ' the Court
confirmed that its jurisdictional rulings in federal Indian law were based on
federal common law and not the Constitution and therefore cold be altered by
Congress. However, the lead opinion of Justice Breyer is full of caveats.
Thus, Justice Breyer cautioned that the congressional reaffirmation of tribal
authority at issue in the case was a "small" one concerning the tribe's
authority over its "own lands" and not "dealing with potential constitutional
limits on congressional efforts to legislate far more radical changes in tribal
status," involving "interference with the power or authority of any State. '"252
Professor Perry Dane once stated that "[t]he great question in Indian law..
is whether we can hope to regulate political whim without diluting that legal,
existential recognition [of tribal sovereignty].,, 253 He further explained that
what he meant was that "despite the very different tones and political
purposes" of the congressional plenary power and inherent tribal sovereignty
doctrines, "there is in fact a deeper connection between them than we might
like to admit." '254 In other words, judicial recognition of inherent tribal
sovereignty may not have occurred if the Court had not first declared that
Congress had plenary power to regulate such sovereignty. Yet, today, as the
result of the decisions reviewed in this article, inherent tribal sovereignty has
been drastically reduced not by the Congress but by the Supreme Court.
Justice Breyer's caveats in Lara may even indicate that many on the Court
may think that the "plenary" power of Congress is no longer what it used to
be. There is a certain hydraulic quality to political power. If the tribes and
Congress have lost some power, where did it go? The analysis presented in
Part III of this article indicates that such power may have gone to a Supreme
Court who seems more than willing to hand it over to the states.
Moreover, even if Congress still does have the power to reverse some of the
Court's Indian decisions, I have a suspicion that unlike some other areas of the
law, the Court knows that its federal common law rulings on Indian matters
will seldomly, if ever, be contradicted or overturned by Congress. Of all the
cases mentioned in this article that have gone against tribal interests, only one,
251. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
252. Id. at 205.
253. Perry Dane, The Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12 CARDOzo L. REV. 959, 973
(1991).
254. Id. at 973 n.43.
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Duro v. Reina,2" denying tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians,
was overturned by Congress.256 On civil jurisdictional issues, only twice in
the last thirty years, the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978,257 and the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988,2"8 has Congress assumed the lead in
comprehensively determining the jurisdictional framework in a given area.
I believe that it would be a mistake to think that this lack of congressional
reaction implies congressional approval of what the Court has done. Yet the
Court's formalism has meant the adoption of subjective and arbitrary rules,
applicable to all tribes, and creating presumptions against tribal jurisdiction
and in favor of state jurisdiction. The burden is now on the tribes to go to
Congress to overcome these presumptions. Congress is, however, a political
body and it has become increasingly hard to overturn broad general rules
applicable across the board. The time for such national Indian legislation has
perhaps passed.259 Rather than looking for comprehensive national solutions,
as was the case in ICWA and IGRA, perhaps we have entered a period where
it would be more productive for each tribe to strike its own deal with
individual states and local interest groups and then bring that compromise to
Congress for approval or ratification. Certainly, this has already been done
in many tribal land claims and water rights settlements. Some scholars have
even suggested that, normatively speaking, each tribe should be considered
separately for the purpose of federal Indian common law.'" Although I am
not sure that I agree with such scholars' normative arguments, perhaps it
makes sense, at least politically, for each tribe to strike its own political deal.
Tribal specific congressional legislation would at least force the Court to look
255. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
256. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000) (amending the Indian Civil Rights Act to provide that the
definition of tribal powers of self-government include "the inherent power of Indian tribes,
hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians").
257. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1923).
258. Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified as amended at25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721).
259. But see Kevin Washburn, Tribal Self Determination at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L.
REV. 777 (2006) (pointing out that the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 was a product of the
New Deal and the Indian Self Determination policy had its origins in the war on poverty and
suggesting that national Indian legislation could still be possible if the tribes could tag such
legislation to a broader social movement).
260. See Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELLL. REV. 1069 (2004);
see also Ezra Rosser, Ambiguity and the Academic: The Dangerous Attraction of Pan-Indian
Legal Analysis, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 141 (2005), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/
issues/1 19/dec05/rosser.pdf.
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more at specific historical contexts and the realities "on the ground" as
recently advocated by some.26'
261. See Frickey, Towards a New Realism, supra note 19, at 660-66.
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